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Abstract (525 words) 
Section I challenges Schultz’s assertions: (1) small farmers are rational; (2) low income countries 
saddled with traditional agriculture have not the problem of many farmers leaving agriculture for 
nonfarm jobs; (3) part-time farming can be efficient; (4) economies of scale do not exist in 
agriculture; and (5) investment in human capital counts much more than institutional changes and is 
the key to agricultural growth. It reveals that ever since the 1950s, after the land reform, the 
irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent (mainly small) farmers 
earning higher off-farm income but unwilling to lease their insufficiently produced land beyond 
family consumption need to full-time farmers, has evolutionarily been a global obstacle with both 
public and private land ownership, traditional and modern agriculture, fragmented small and 
consolidatorily enlarged land, low and high income economies, food under-self-sufficiency and 
overproduction, and developing and developed countries, albeit land property rights have been well 
defined and sale/lease allowed, causing many negative consequences on agriculture, rural 
development, income distribution, government expenditure, competition, trade, environment, etc. 
(Polyopoly is designed by the author to mean the control by many sellers in contrast to monopoly 
and oligopoly). It has become a microeconomic root of the three persisting global macroeconomic 
problems: under-self-sufficiency, overproduction and agricultural protectionism. Evidence in Asia, 
Africa, South and North Americas, and Europe is cited. 
Section II argues that Hirschman ignores that it has hampered the linkage effects. 
  Section III presents that only China has successfully exercised effective and appropriate 
solutions, but under public land ownership which may be unacceptable to others. 
Section IV indicates that effective and appropriate solutions have not been adopted under 
private land ownership world-wide. It presents two effective (but not appropriate) Western 
European legislations and their shortcomings at the under-self-sufficiency stage, and fundamental 
and derived dilemmas at the overproduction stage at which, without a solution, the EU (and many 
other developed nations) has exercised protectionism by a coupling between subsidies and 
production (which together with price supports, export aids and import restrictions has made their 
farmers less competitive and harmed their consumers and taxpayers and the developing countries). 
In July 2002 the EU proposed a complete decoupling, but retreated in June 2003 to allow the 
Member States to keep the coupling, due to no solution to avoid production abandonment caused by 
part-time and absent landowners’ refusal to lease their irrationally and polyopolistically used land to 
full-time farmers at low rents, which has just exposed this microeconomic root of protectionism. 
  Section V proposes effective and appropriate solutions for both developing and developed 
countries at both under-self-sufficiency and overproduction stages without changing private land 
ownership to achieve the following aims at the same time: minimize/abolish/prevent protectionism, 
while avoiding production abandonment and overproduction; reinforce full-time large farmers, 
whereas not crowding part-time and absent small farmers out of agriculture; reach/maintain basic 
self-sufficiency in cereals, meanwhile promoting multi-functionality of other agricultural and rural 
sectors and improving the environment.  
Section VI predicts the promotion of fraternity among nations if the proposed solutions 
could be adopted globally. The author’s analyses and suggestions have received positive responses 
from the EU, EU accession countries, CABI, OECD, UN, CSD, FAO, UNEP and World Bank.    2
I. Schultz’s Assertions versus the History and Reality
1 
 
(I) Rationality of Small Farmers, Pursuit of Nonfarm Jobs, and Efficiency of Part-Time Farming 
1. A Critique of Schultz’s Assertions 
(1) Definitions of efficiency and rationality 
In Transforming Traditional Agriculture [1964] (reprinted in 1983 without changing views) which 
won the 1979 Nobel Economics Prize, `Schultz makes the very important point that farmers in low 
income countries are rational and make effective use of their resources. They are poor because their 
resources are very limited and because the knowledge is not available that would permit them to 
produce the same output with fewer resources or a larger output from the same resources’ (Johnson 
1983). According to Commentator AE2 (2003), ‘In the framework of Prof Schultz, the rationality 
refers to the maximizing behavior subject to certain constraints, which is nothing but standard 
definition of the rationality in economics’. Thus, rationality and efficiency (effectiveness) are the 
same for Schultz.  
However, the author’s definitions of efficiency and rationality are not the same, and he treats 
the maximizing behavior only as the definition of efficiency and regards inefficient land use as land 
under-utilization. Generally speaking, when a country has not achieved stable basic self-
sufficiency
2 in cereals,
3 any land insufficiently cultivated or idled may be regarded as inefficiently 
used. When a country has encountered constant overproduction,
4 if a land insufficiently cultivated 
                                                 
1 A first-time systematical and analytical criticism of most assertions of Schultz mentioned in this section has been 
made in the author’s book (Zhou 2001: 11, 26-9, 76, 131, 152, 218, 244, 265, 288, 344, 373, 382, 384,  429), while this 
paper highlights and develops it. The book has cited 763 references most of which serve as evidence against his 
assertions on Japan (Chapter 4 with nine features of the Japanese model), other rice-based economies under private land 
ownership in monsoon Asia (Chapter 5: 184-88), China (Chapters 6-7 with 13 features of the Chinese model), other 
rice-based economies under public land ownership in monsoon Asia (Chapter 8), the USA (Chapters 9-10 with eight 
features of the American model), OECD and EU in general (Chapter 11: 397-8), Central-Eastern Europe (CEEC) and 
Central Asia (Chapter 11: 399-430), whereas this paper summarizes these lengthy texts into paragraphs and adds proofs 
in West Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therefore this section is a supplement to that  book in terms of the criticism of 
Schultz’s assertions and evidence. 
2 According to JSY (2005: 276), self-sufficiency ratio = [volume (or value) of domestic production (vdp) ÷ volume (or 
value) of domestic consumption (vdc)] x 100. Thus, a country could be regarded as having achieved self-sufficiency in 
one product if its (vdp ÷ vdc) x 100 = 100, over-self-sufficiency if its (vdp ÷ vdc) x 100 > 100, or under-self-sufficiency 
if its (vdp ÷ vdc) x 100 < 100. However, this is only in absolute terms. In relative terms, if a country has reached self-
sufficiency or over-self-sufficiency in cereals in absolute terms, but there are still people in hunger (without obtaining 
the minimum daily calorie stipulated by the United Nations), then it has under-self-sufficiency in cereals in relative 
terms. An example could be Brazil which has been a net exporter of cereals and reached over-self-sufficiency in 
absolute terms, but also possessed many people in hunger and hence not achieved self-sufficiency in relative terms in 
cereals. The distinction between self-sufficiency in absolute and relative terms is designed by the author as not seen in 
the literature. A reference for the quantity of the basic self-sufficiency in cereals may be taken from China: over 90% of 
domestic production (Chen 2004). 
3 Exactly speaking, under-self-sufficiency in cereals should mean a self-sufficiency ratio in cereals under 100%. For 
convenience, however, the author uses this term as indicating under-basic-self-sufficiency in cereals. 
4 Overproduction of a product of a country shall mean the surplus of that product of that country which could not be 
sold internally or externally without or even with agricultural protectionism. This definition is formulated by the author 
as not seen in the literature. Agricultural protectionism denotes five main components: (1) subsidies coupled with 
production, (2) price supports, (3) export aids, (4) import restrictions including (i) either prohibition or high tariff for 
import and (ii) non-tariff barriers, and (5) subsidies decoupled from production at level beyond the WTO standards. The 
non-tariff barriers are not discussed here so as to concentrate on resolving the other items as the first priority. In a 
country without protectionism, (1) if domestic production is equal to domestic consumption, it is a competitive or true 
self-sufficiency; (2) if domestic production is more than domestic consumption, and the surplus is salable abroad, it is 
over-self-sufficiency but not overproduction; however if it is unsalable abroad, it is both over-self-sufficiency and 
overproduction, but it would not last long, as farmers would have no incentive to overproduce unsalable surplus; (3) if 
domestic production is less than domestic consumption, it is under-self-sufficiency, but the insufficiency gap would be 
matched by imports. In a country with protectionism, when domestic costs are higher than import costs, (1) if domestic 
production is equal to domestic consumption, it is a protectionist or untrue self-sufficiency; since if without 
protectionism, it would turn out to be under-self-sufficiency, as part or all of products would be imported, while the   3
or idled is requested by another farmer for farming, but the landholder does not agree to transfer it 
out, it may be perceived as inefficiently used; but if it is not needed by any other farmer, it may not. 
(This dynamic definition is not in the author’s 2001 book). A reference for the criterion of 
insufficiently used land is in the Italian `Rules for the Utilization of the Uncultivated, Abandoned or 
Insufficiently Cultivated Lands’ of 4 August 1978 (Art. 2): `Those lands whose average ordinary 
production in the last three years have not reached 40% of those obtained under the same 
cultivation, in the same period, on the lands of the same census zone, with the same cadastral 
characteristics, the cultural features being taken into account, are regarded as insufficiently 
cultivated’. 
Furthermore, the author includes social justice (or appropriateness) into the definition of 
rationality. There are mainly two parts of the social justice, (1) for a basic social welfare of the 
farmers and (2) for the interests of the society. A non-maximizing behavior is inefficient but may be 
regarded as rational as long as it caters farmers’ basic social welfare. But if the basic social welfare 
of the farmers has been catered, while the farmers still do not wish to transfer the land to other 
farmers who need it for effective use, then a non-maximizing behavior is irrational. This behavior 
may be ‘rational’ to the egoist and superficial interests of farmers themselves, but not so to the 
society’s and their fundamental interests, such as in the waiting room of an airport at night, while 
some passengers have no seat at all and have to sit on the ground, others occupy more than one for a 
more comfortable sleeping. [The division and relationship between the efficiency and rationality are 
implicit in the author’s book (Zhou 2001: 28), but explicit here]. A deeper analysis will be made 
when discussing the high income stage. 
(2) At the low income economy 
Schultz treats the low income countries as closed from the high wage stage or high income 
economy, as he states ([1964] 1983: 3-4, 11, 15): `Farming based wholly upon the kinds of factors 
of production that have been used by farmers for generations can be called traditional agriculture.’ 
`A major new problem has arisen in a number of high income countries in which the agricultural 
sector has been most successful in adopting and using modern factors of production. It is the 
problem of adapting agriculture with its high rate of increase in labor productivity to a high income 
economy in which the demand for farm products is of slow growth. It becomes an acute problem 
when the labor force required for farming begins to decline at a substantial rate and many of the 
farm people . . . leave agriculture . . . for nonfarm jobs'. `But countries still saddled with traditional 
agriculture are not up against this particular problem.' Thus, the `related economic issues’ of `the 
relatively low rate of increase in the demand for farm products as income rises’ and `the adaptation 
of the agricultural sector to growth in high income countries' are `not considered’ by him.  
This paper, however, stresses that at least from the early 1950s on, the low income countries 
still saddled with traditional agriculture have been increasingly open to the high income economy, as 
small peasants there would migrate to those rural areas which have entered the high wage stage, cities 
and abroad to earn higher income as part-time and absent farmers,
5 thus also are up against the 
particular problem of adapting the agricultural sector to a high income economy. For example, 
although prewar Japan in East Asia was developed, its industrialization from the very beginning on 
                                                                                                                                                                  
domestically unsalable products would become overproduced, hence hidden under-self-sufficiency and hidden 
overproduction; (2) if domestic production is more than domestic consumption, and the surplus is salable abroad, it is 
both over-self-sufficiency and overproduction, because if without protectionism, part or all of exports would not be 
realized, and would turn to be overproduced, hence hidden overproduction; when a country has partly allowed imports, 
there could be coexistence of over-self-sufficiency, overproduction together with imports (revealing the uncompetitive 
or untrue self-sufficiency or over-self-sufficiency), as the domestically and externally unsalable surplus due to the 
higher costs would be accumulated into excessive inventory, while low cost products would be imported (this could the 
case of South Korea, see later); (3) if domestic production is less than domestic consumption, it is under-self-
sufficiency. These classifications are formulated by the author as not seen in the literature. 
5 It would be more appropriate to call absent farmers as nominal farmers since an absentee cannot farm. They are called so 
just in order to reflect their psychology of not abandoning the title of farmers so as to facilitate their return to farming once 
having lost off-farm jobs. This explanation is not contained in the author’s book (Zhou 2001).   4
was based on its imports of foods from, and exports of industrial goods to, colonies (Taiwan 
Province of China during 1895-1945 and Korea during 1910-45), `as it found that capitalistic rice-
growing was a low-productivity undertaking’ in its agricultural sector, which was really `relatively 
stagnant and “sick” in the decades leading up to World War II’ (WWII) (Oshima 1987: 39, 109). ‘In 
the prewar period, very little machinery was used in monsoon Asian rice-producing economies. 
Tractor cultivation was attempted, but did not meet with much success in the places where it was 
tried. Tools and implements were generally of the simplest type. Under such traditional technologies, 
rice growing in the Orient was one of the most labor-intensive types of agriculture known’ (Wickizer 
& Bennett 1941: 50). Therefore at the end of WWII, Japanese agriculture was a traditional one. Land 
reform was made during 1946-50, which distributed land from large owners to peasants with no or 
little land, raised their incentive for production and productivity,  released peasants from agriculture to 
off-farm activities, which in turn gradually caused agricultural labor shortage and the use of small 
machinery up to 1960. Of all farm households, its full-time households accounted for 53.6% in 1946 
(JSY 1961: 71), 50% in 1950, 34.8% in 1955, 33.7% in 1960, and 20.5% in 1965; and of total farm 
household population, persons engaged mainly in farming (both those engaged exclusively in farming 
and those engaged in farming for more days than in other jobs) took 53.2% in 1955, 42.3% in 1960, 
and 38.3% in 1965 (JSY 1977: 99, 103). Schultz ([1964] 1983: 18) also cites that in Northwest 
Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and the UK), employment in agriculture declined by over one-fifth during 1950-59. 
(3) At the high income economy 
How then about the low income countries which are open to the high income economy? Schultz 
([1964] 1983: 124) claims that `in communities where nearby off-farm jobs are readily available on 
both a part-time basis and a full-time basis the contributions of a human agent become divisible and 
part-time farming becomes possible; and it can be efficient.' 
But this paper emphasizes a reality as contrary to Schultz's assertion. From the natural, 
economic and technological point of view, when there were few off-farm activities, rural 
development was at the low income economy or low wage stage, and peasants had to rely on 
agriculture. As population grew, they had to reclaim uncultivated normal land, then marginal land 
for food. As relatively easily reclaimable land diminished, shortage of land would appear, and land 
rent would rise as many tenants competed for land.  
From the institutional point of view, under the feudal system, a few landlords owned large 
areas of land, while most peasants owned none or little and had to be either tenants paying 
exorbitant rents or laborers receiving extremely low wages. Under the centrally planned economy, 
land was publicly owned and collectively operated. Both systems could not bring about enough 
individual incentives of farmers for production. Hence the land tenure reform for equitable 
individual ownership or individual possession of publicly owned land, which usually distributed 
land to families with a combination of good, bad, remote and nearby parcels, causing fragmented 
small individual farms, which could raise incentives of individual farmers (private landowners or 
individual holders of public land) for production, increase productivity and release surplus peasants 
from agriculture. 
However, in general, the elasticity in consumption of cereals is lower than that of non-
cereal agricultural goods (cash crops, meat, fish, etc.) which in turn is lower than that of industrial 
and service products [keeping in mind that certain special agricultural products (vegetables, fruits, 
cheese, wine, ham, fish, and even a few cereals, etc.) may only be produced in some special 
localities and may have a relatively high elasticity]. From an evolutionary point of view, after 
people become richer, on one hand, they first tend to consume less cereals and more non-cereal 
agricultural goods; but the increase of their consumption of the latter may be limited and such 
consumption may even relatively decline afterwards too (in order to avoid obesity). On the other, 
they still have to consume certain agricultural goods. Therefore the income of the full-time (or 
active) cereal farmers would become lower than that of non-cereal farmers, which would in turn be 
lower than that of off-farm workers. This would induce many able-bodied farmers to first turn to   5
non-cereal production, and then seek off-farm employment, which would result in agricultural labor 
shortage, higher wage demand and use of small machinery (which did not require more land). As 
the economy further enters the high income stage, and labor becomes more expensive than large 
machinery, it would be necessary for the remaining full-time farmers to acquire more land, use 
large machinery, achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, and be viable or more competitive, if the 
part-time and absent small farmers could either sell or lease their irrationally used land to them. 
But a global problem has been that under both public and private land ownership, with both 
traditional and modern agriculture, on both fragmented small land and consolidatorily enlarged 
land, in both low and high income economies, at both stages of food under-self-sufficiency and 
overproduction, and within both developing and developed countries, even though land property 
rights have been well defined and restrictions on land sale or lease removed, many able-bodied part-
time and absent small farmers earning higher off-farm income have little willingness to sell land, in 
order to keep it as a security (so that they could return to farming once having lost off-farm jobs) 
and asset (to be passed to their children), and enjoy the rural environment (for a more natural, 
primitive, less polluted and vacational living). The modern rural facilities similar to those in cities 
(car, bus, train, electricity, gas, refrigerator, tap water, washing machine, television, fixed and 
mobile telephone, fax, computer, Internet, etc.) have made living in the rural areas convenient. They 
have little willingness to lease it out either, mainly due to low rent (the full-time farmers could not 
pay high rent because the revenue from production of cereals and many other agricultural goods 
would not be high due to their low elasticity in consumption), avoidance of possible misuse by 
tenants (who might apply much chemical fertilizer in order to gain a short-term high output), 
jealousy in preventing neighbors from prospering, self-use for family consumption and hobby, and 
fear that land leased out may not be withdrawn. The higher off-farm income has made the part-time 
and absent small farmers unnecessary to either sell or lease out land. These are the major reasons 
why the free market mechanism itself could not effectively lead the able-bodied part-time and 
absent small farmers to transfer their irrationally used land to the full-time farmers. Actually, the 
higher the off-farm income, and the more stable the off-farm jobs the able-bodied part-time and 
absent small farmers have obtained, the less incentive they would have in selling or leasing out their 
land. The irrational land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers tend to expand from 
seasonal to year-around.
6 
                                                 
6 The author’s book (Zhou 2001: 7) shall be the first in literature to systematically reveal the irrational land use by able-
bodied part-time and absent small farmers as a global obstacle. The monsoon Asia part is based on his PhD thesis 
defended in February 1998 in European University Institute (EUI, Florence, Italy) which received a unanimous praise of 
an international jury of experts: `We recommend the award of the PhD and congratulate the candidate on a comprehensive 
analysis of a highly complex and significant problem and for his carefully considered suggestion for its solution.' It was the 
second PhD thesis in economics receiving the jury's congratulations in the history of EUI. They regarded it as publishable 
as the Department of Economics of EUI stipulated that a thesis could be defended only after all the examiners have 
determined it as publishable. Indeed, even before the defense, two publishers (Edward Elgar Publishing and Ashgate 
Publishing) had already accepted its entirety. Edward Elgar (1997) declares that this book `will make a significant 
contribution to an important but rather neglected area’. Of 167 theses defended in the Department of Economics of EUI 
since its foundation in 1976 until 2 February 2001, only 13 or 7.8% had been published as books, including this one. (Zhou 
2001: xxi-xxii, 24). After the defense, the thesis was revised and extended to the USA, Europe and Central Asia. Before 
the publication, four components were published by FAO [search (www.fao.org)] and four by CABI, and various parts 
accepted by international conferences held by FAO, USDA, WIDER, etc., in Bulgaria, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, the UK and USA respectively (e.g., the 
part on the USA was accepted by the USDA Second National Small Farm Conference while that on CEECs-NIS by five 
international conferences on transition). The book has received endorsements [see (www.e-elgar.co.uk) 
(www.amazon.com)], and positive reviews in `World Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology Abstracts’, October 
2001, Vol. 43, No. 10, Abstract 6046; `Rural Development Abstracts’, December 2001, Vol. 24, Abstract 2480; 
`Journal of Economic Literature’, March 2002: 301-2; `Agricultural Economics’, January 2003, Vol. 28, Issue 1: 71-4; 
and 'Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture', Feb. 2003, Vol. 42, No. 1: 114-6 which judges ‘this path-breaking 
book’, ‘His approach is very broad’, ‘The discussion of these types – along with the consequences they bring with them 
– provides insights that can hardly be found anywhere else’, ‘The book is full of in-depth observations and analyses’, ‘It 
is one of the most important contributions in our time to land-tenure literature and a must for all of those working in the   6
Here, the author, according to his above-mentioned definitions of efficiency and rationality, 
raises a hypothesis (which is implicit in his 2001 book but explicit here) that, with the same 
conditions (health, age, gender, diligence, education, skills, intelligence, information, etc.) between 
full-time and part-time farmers, in comparison with full-time farming, part-time farming cannot be 
efficient in terms of land use; while that for family consumption is inefficient but can be rational 
(mainly as an economic, social and technological buffer), that beyond family consumption need 
both inefficient and irrational. 
This is basically because full-time farmers could have more time to learn and apply modern 
agricultural science and technology, take care of farming and the environment, cultivate more land 
to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs, and thus ‘produce the same output with fewer 
resources or a larger output from the same resources’ than part-time farmers. It is important to 
notice that even if the knowledge that would permit them to produce the same output with fewer 
resources or a larger output from the same resources is available, the part-time and absent farmers 
may not have enough time to learn and apply it, especially the modern scientific knowledge, as 
Schultz himself has admitted ([1964] 1983: 203-4): ‘Farm people even more than many workers in 
nonfarm jobs must acquire skills and knowledge drawn from science if they are to be effective in 
using modern agricultural factors of production’, and ‘Much of what is learned that is vocationally 
relevant at the time will be wholly obsolete as agriculture in the community adopts and uses ever 
more modern agricultural factors.’ They may not have enough energy to take care of their idled or 
insufficiently used land.
7  
But part-time (and absent) farmers may need a part of land for family consumption products 
(as an economic buffer), for keeping farming skills (as a technological buffer) and for survival once 
lost off-farm jobs (as a social buffer). Thus, on the part of land for family consumption, part-time 
farming, though inefficient compared with full-time farming, can be rational. 
However, if part-time (and absent) farmers are unwilling to transfer the insufficiently 
produced land beyond the family consumption need to the full-time farmers who need it for efficient 
use to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs, be viable or more competitive, then part-time 
farming is both inefficient and irrational.
8 [A detailed discussion on the irrational land use by able-
bodied part-time and absent small farmers in terms of the property rights and transaction costs 
theories including those by Coase, North, Demsetz, Furubotn and Pejovich, Laffont, Milgrom and 
Roberts, and Varian is in Zhou (2001: Chapter 3)]. 
In reality, if the part-time and absent small farmers could be guaranteed with a back-up basic 
social welfare and provided with appropriate remuneration, then some of them (especially old ones 
and single females without husband who owing to physical restrictions normally carry out relatively 
less farm or off-farm activities and wish to earn some rent) would be willing to transfer their 
otherwise irrationally used land in various suitable forms to the full-time farmers for effective use, 
yet others (particularly able-bodied ones) would still be unwilling to do so.
9  As a result, the 
remaining full-time small farmers, largely non-viable as the economy develops into the high wage 
                                                                                                                                                                  
field’, ‘Zhou’s contribution is, however, remarkable in any case’. The author has provided consultations to FAO and 
OECD, and acted as a referee for `Agricultural Economics’ at their invitations and been asked by ‘Contemporary 
Authors’ to be listed there. 
7 Evidence that the part-time and absent small farmers may not have enough time and energy to learn and apply the 
modern scientific knowledge and take care of their idled or insufficiently used land is in the author’s book (Zhou 2001: 
138-9 for Japan; 185-8 for other rice-based economies in monsoon Asia under private land ownership; 214-6, 248 for 
China; 383 for the USA; 397-8 for Portugal, OECD and EU in general; 416 for CEECs-NIS; 413 for Kazakhstan; 415-7 
for Armenia; 418 for Georgia and Albania; 419 for Croatia; 421-2 for Slovenia; 424 for Poland). This paper will add 
evidence for West Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
8 The points that part-time farming cannot be efficient (in comparison with full-time farming), but that for family 
consumption is inefficient while rational and that beyond family consumption need both inefficient and irrational are 
implicit in the author’s book (Zhou 2001: 28), but explicitly indicated here. 
9 Evidence that old and single female part-time and absent small farmers are much more willing to lease land out than 
able-bodied ones is in the author’s book (Zhou 2001: 134 for Japan; 377-8 for the USA; 416 for CEECs-NIS; 419 for 
Croatia; 424 for Poland).   7
stage, could not easily get the resources irrationally held by the able-bodied part-time and absent 
small farmers for effective use, although the knowledge and other conditions are available to both 
the full-time, and part-time and absent small farmers that would permit them to produce the same 
output with fewer resources or a larger output from the same resources. National food security 
could only be kept at the subsistence level or could not even be maintained without huge 
government subsidies. Budget burden, unnecessary food under-self-sufficiency and import, higher 
domestic and international prices of agricultural goods, artificial food overproduction, agricultural 
trade protectionism, low competitiveness of farmers, inequitable income distribution, persisting 
poverty, insufficient cultivation or idleness of land, waste of other resources, soil degradation, 
environmental deterioration, etc. would also be incurred. Therefore at least some (mainly able-
bodied) part-time and absent small farmers are not rational to the society's and their own 
fundamental interests, even if they may be ‘rational’ enough to their egoist and superficial interests.  
2. Caveats and a Historical and Dynamic Approach 
Commentator AE1 (2003) states that ‘Chayanov (1923)  already demonstrates the efficient 
characteristics of part-time farming, family farming and small farms for agriculture in Europe, 
Russia and Japan at the end of the 18th century, characteristics that Schultz refers to in his 1964 
book.’ The author is grateful to this comment because it may be representative of many other 
readers, and thus presents some caveats below. 
 (1) Family farming may not be equal to small farms’ farming. The author’s 2001 book has 
collected evidence that most of the successful and efficient large-scale farming is based on family 
farming (Zhou 2001: 135, 138 for Japan; 248-77 for China; 321-7 for the USA; 416-8 for Armenia 
and Georgia; 419 for Croatia; 422 for Slovenia). 
 (2) Small farms may not be equivalent to inefficiency. (i) At the low income economy, the 
land tenure reform for equitable individual ownership or individual possession of publicly owned 
land may bring huge incentives for production to farmers even upon fragmented small farms 
(evidence is in the author’s book Zhou 2001: 123-7 for Japan; 191-209 for China; 333-4 for the 
USA; 416-8 for Armenia, Georgia and Albania). (ii) At the high income economy or the transition 
from the low to high income economy, there are also small farms whose owners or holders are full-
time farmers, love farming and till land efficiently. Of them, those who could get more land could 
achieve economies of scale and become competitive [evidence is in Zhou 2001: 135, 138 for Japan; 
223-94 for China; 378-80 for the USA; 416-8 for Armenia and Georgia; 419 for Croatia; 422 for 
Slovenia (implicitly)]; while those who could not get more land would have difficulty for even 
survival without huge government subsidies, or also become part-time and absent farmers (evidence 
is in Zhou 2001: 138-46 for Japan and Taiwan Province of China; 209-22 for China; 382-4 for the 
USA; 414 for Poland; 416-8 for Armenia and Georgia; 419 for Croatia; this paper will add evidence 
for Mexico). 
 (3)  Old and single female farmers are much more willing to lease land out than able-bodied 
part-time and absent small farmers, as mentioned above. 
(4) Large landowners are much more willing to either cultivate their land or lease it out. 
Large landowners still exist chiefly in those countries (i) where the land reform has not been 
completed (Brazil, the Philippines, South Africa, etc.), (ii) where after the land reform, small 
landowners gradually sold land to others who accordingly accumulated land (the USA, Canada, 
etc.), and (iii) where the land enclosure had driven small owners to cities to be cheap industrial 
workers and concentrated land to some large owners (the UK). Compared with small landowners, 
large ones are much more willing to either cultivate their land or lease it out principally because 
their gains from economies of scale would exceed the costs. Suppose 100 ha of land are owned by 
100 persons, each 1 ha. If one cultivates or leases out this small land, he (she) may not earn much, 
while still bearing the potential risks the tenant might incur to his (her) land. Thus, if he had enough 
off-farm income, he would prefer to neither produce sufficiently on it nor lease it out. In contrast, if 
100 ha are owned by one person, his gains from either producing sufficiently on it or leasing it out 
would be higher than his costs owing to economies of scale (which will be further dealt with later).   8
Of course, it has also happened that some large landowners are rich enough and just idle or under-
utilize a part of land, if they feel the market prices are not high enough for them to produce 
sufficiently on it, and if the tenants could not afford to pay high rents. (Therefore this paper will 
finally propose to give full-time farmers access to any land insufficiently produced beyond the 
family consumption need of the owner no matter whether he is large or small). 
With the above-mentioned caveats, the following discussion will concentrate on the 
inefficient and irrational aspect of the able-bodied part-time (and absent) small farmers (rather than 
putting ‘part-time farming, family farming and small farms’ in the same category as Chayanov 
presents) in a historical and dynamic approach. 
  The author has pointed out at the earlier part of this paper that from the natural, economic 
and technological point of view, when there were few off-farm activities, rural development was at 
the low income economy or low wage stage, and peasants had to rely on agriculture. As population 
grew, they had to reclaim firstly uncultivated normal land, and then marginal land for food. As 
relatively easily reclaimable land diminished, shortage of land would appear. Relatively easily 
reclaimable land largely disappeared in Asia before the 1950s (Ishikawa 1967: 61), and also in many 
other continents following the population explosion in the post-war period, which Schultz ([1964] 
1983: 179) has also recognized - ‘But good farm land is no longer around for the taking, except in a 
few parts of Latin America and in some areas elsewhere which are still inaccessible from lack of 
roads and other transport facilities’. Until then (including the end of the 18th century), whether part-
time farmers were efficient or not, they would not affect full-time farmers very much since 
relatively easily reclaimable land was still available. But evolutionarily speaking, afterwards, the 
full-time farmers could not increase farm size if part-time and absent small farmers did not sell or 
lease out their irrationally used land (i.e., the part beyond their family consumption need).  
3. Polyopoly of Cultivable Land 
Exactly because on this earth, cultivable land can no more be created, the owners and holders of 
such scarce resource possess a polyopoly, which is invented by the author to denote the control of a 
kind of resource by many sellers in comparison with monopoly (by one seller) and oligopoly (by a 
few sellers).
10 For instance, in the expansion of a city, many owners of the surrounding land may 
demand very high prices for selling their land. Accordingly, polyopsony means the control of a kind 
of resource by many buyers in comparison with monopsony (by one buyer) and oligopsony (by a 
few buyers). For example, using polyopsony, many consumers of a country may boycott the 
imported products of another country. Of course, it is not the task of this paper to discuss all types 
of polyopoly and polyopsony and analyze which should receive social management. But the 
polyopoly reflected in the refusal of leasing the insufficiently produced land beyond the family 
consumption need by part-time and absent small farmers at low rents to the full-time farmers, is 
irrational and anti-market economy, could not be resolved by the free market mechanism itself, and 
should thus be intervened by the society (just as anti-monopoly and oligopoly) in order to reach a 
rational and competitive land use. 
4. Evidence in Asia, Africa, South and North Americas, Oceania, and Europe 
Using a comparative approach, the author generates the Japanese model of rural development as a 
leading example which would be universally meaningful. The Japanese model of rural development 
began by (feature 1) a land reform for individual ownership in 1946-50 with protection of tenants 
from eviction, low land rent, and land-holding ceiling in order to prevent the revival of feudal 
landlordism through land repurchasing. Although numerous fragmented small farms were 
maintained, it brought in huge incentives to peasants for production. Meanwhile national rural 
cooperatives were set up to provide overall services to family farms. Through (feature 2) 
government policies supporting rice production and rural development (chiefly rice self-sufficiency, 
                                                 
10 The author is most grateful to Ian Fraser, Ken Hulley and Nicola Owtram for their help in choosing a proper English 
word from several proposed by the author to describe the phenomenon, and to Ian Fraser for advising the author to 
determine to use polyopoly. According to him, mono and oligo are originated from Greek, so as poly; in order to avoid 
polypoly, o is added in between, hence polyopoly.   9
rice price support, farm credit and subsidies, technological research and extension services); 
(feature 3) construction of rural infrastructure (mainly irrigation, land improvement, transportation, 
communication, electrification, and education); (feature 4) higher yielding and multiple cropping of 
rice and other cereals (which raised both land and labor productivity and released labor from cereal 
culture); (feature 5) diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture (which increased peasants' 
income, changed agricultural structures, and led to the establishment of rural enterprises for 
processing, transporting and marketing crop, livestock, fishery and forestry products); (feature 6) 
off-farm employment (which offered peasants jobs in both urban and rural enterprises, further 
raised peasants' income, altered rural structures, and promoted urbanization); and (feature 7) 
peasant migration to cities and work in town and village firms mainly by able-bodied males, full 
employment was realized and wages rose, which resulted in (feature 8) agricultural mechanization 
with small machinery. In 1960, rice self-sufficiency was attained, the first transition (agriculture to 
industry) completed, labor shortage appeared, and the second transition (industry to services) 
started. These positive features would be useful for other countries. 
However, even though land consolidation [exchange of private ownership and location of 
spatially dispersed parcels of farms to form new holdings containing a single (or as few as possible) 
parcel(s), with the same (or similar) value as that of the original areas] has been progressing ever 
since 1949, the purchase of land by farmers was subsidized by the government from 1961 on, the 
land-holding ceiling relaxed in 1962, land rent control removed in 1970, and landlords allowed to 
retrieve land after long-term lease in 1970 and after short-term lease in 1980, (feature 9) the 
irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has 
remained as the last obstacle still unresolved to sustainable rural development.
11 In order to be 
viable and gain higher incomes, farmers (mainly full-time ones) and cooperatives lobbied for 
government protectionism of rice production. The ruling party yielded, fearing the loss of votes. 
Rice import prohibition during 1961-93 caused international protests. The government subsidies to 
farmers through buying rice at higher, and selling it at lower, prices resulted in major budget deficits 
and also artificial overproduction. In order to reduce surplus the government again paid farmers to cut 
young crops or turn rice to forage. Under the pressure of the WTO and USA, since 1994, it has 
imported rice but also set up high tariff and non-tariff barriers to restrict import. Its trade-distorting 
agricultural subsidies (around 60%) has been much higher than the WTO standards (10% of the 
total value of production for a developing country and 5% for a developed one), as Table 1 shows. 
Rice costs and prices rose well above the prevailing international levels. Its self-sufficiency has been 
kept until 1996 and reduced to 99%, 95%, 95%, 95%, 95% and 96% during 1997-2002 artificially 
under the heavy state protectionism. Most of other agricultural products, with less or no government 
subsidies, have lost self-sufficiency since the 1960s, and all have fallen into this situation since 
1994. The only exception is whale, whose self-sufficiency has been maintained (at least until 2000, 
the ratio afterwards is not published by JSY) at the expense of this scarce sea animal despite the 
continuous international protests. Of all farmers, those in full-time decreased from 33.7% in 1960 to 
20.1% in 2003, and those in part-time 1 (mainly farming) reduced from 21.2% in 1980 to 13.1% in 
2003, while those in part-time 2 (mainly other jobs) grew from 66.2% in 1980 to 66.9% in 2003. 
During 1965-2003, there has been a general trend of a decrease of the total agricultural labor force 
and those males and females aged between 15-64, and an increase of those aged 65 and over. The 
utilization rate of cultivated land has been dropping from 133.9% in 1960 to 100% in 1993, 99.3% 
in 1994, and 94.4% in 2002. (JSY 1977: 100; JSY 1986: 159; JSY 1992: 153; JSY 1993/94: 272; 
JSY 1997: 235, 276; JSY 1999: 231; JSY 2000: 268; JSY 2002: 230, 231, 237, 278; JSY 2003: 278; 
JSY 2005: 230, 231, 237, 274). The cultivated land abandonment ratio grew from 2% in 1975 to  
                                                 
11 The author (Zhou 2001: 7) has cited Oshima’s view (1987: 65) that the last obstacle to sustainable rural development 
in monsoon Asia is (fragmented) small farms, but added that the inefficient (irrational) land use by able-bodied part-
time and absent small farmers (private landowners or individual holders of public land) is the cause. Here it is 
developed by incorporating the polyopolistic use into the cause and regarding this cause as the last obstacle to 
sustainable rural development globally no matter whether the land is fragmented and small or not.   10
Table 1  Producer Support Estimate (%PSE) * of 22 Countries, EU and OECD 1986-2002 
(Percentage in Value of Production) 
Year  86-90  91 93  95  96 97  98 99
 p 2000  2001
   2002
 p 
Bulgaria      -39 -4 -25 -54 -10  2  -6       




Estonia 75  59  -32 0  7  5  19  5       




Latvia 80  83  -40 5  3  4  16  17       
Lithuania 77  -262  -37 0  1  3  13  14       
Poland #  -4  -1  12  11  15  14  21  21  15  15  14 
Romania  45 15  16  10  12 3 28 18       
Slovakia  #  50 39  30  12 1 8 27 24 25 16 21 
Slovenia     28  37  29  37  44  48       
Russia 78  60  -24 16  24  29  14  2       
EU-15  #  43 50  42  38  34  34  39 43 34 34 36 
OECD  39 39  37  33  30  29  34 37 32 31 31 
Year 86-88                
EU-15  #  44               
OECD  39               
Australia  #  9        7 5 5 4 4 
Canada #  33            17  17  19  17  20 
Iceland #  75            67  67  64  60  63 
Japan #  67            62  64  60  59  59 
Korea, South #  71            57  69  67  63  66 
Mexico #  -1            14  15  24  21  22 
New  Zealand  #  11       1 1 1 1 1 
Norway #  66            67  67  68  67  71 
Switzerland #  73            70  72  72  72  75 
Turkey #  14            25  23  21  10  23 
USA #  25            23  25  22  23  18 
 
* Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and 
taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, 
regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income. Support expressed as percentage of gross 
farm receipts (%PSE) shows the amount of support to farmers, irrespective of the structure of a given country. For this 
reason, the %PSE is the most widely used indicator for comparisons of support across countries, commodities and time. It 
is equivalent to that for the trade-distorting agricultural subsidies. 
p - Provisional. 
# Member states of the OECD. 
Sources: OECD 2000: 25, 101-2. OECD 2001a: 71, 76-7. OECD 2001b: 181-2. OECD 2003: 213-4. 
 
3.8% in 1995 (in so doing, the owners abandoned operation but not ownership, and consequently 
others still could not use their land). (For a detailed discussion, see Zhou 2001: 123-46). 
In East Asia, the Japanese model was just repeated by Taiwan Province of China in the 
1970s and South Korea in the 1980s (for more information, see Zhou 2001: 7, 146, 184-5). In South 
Korea, the government on one hand has been purchasing rice at a very high price level, which has 
led to overproduction by farmers (according to its Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, surplus rice 
was 150,000 tons per year and the inventory had reached 1,500,000 tons by December 2003); and 
on the other exercising rice import protectionism, which has caused domestic rice price level five 
times that of China and Southeast Asia. This trade distorting behavior has violated the rules of the 
WTO and incurred its pressure to reduce overproduction and open domestic market. Thus on 4 
December 2003 the government proclaimed a bill signed by President Moo-hyun Roh (Roh, Moo-  11
hyun) to reduce the rice purchasing price of per 40 kg by merely 2% to 59,200 won (about 50 US 
dollars) in order to decrease the overproduction. However, politically speaking, such measure 
would incur opposition by many members of the Parliament as they rely on farmers’ votes, as 
evidenced by the fact that the rice purchasing price had never been reduced ever since 1948 when 
South Korea was founded. (TTNN 2003). Economically speaking, even if the rice purchasing price 
were reduced, and overproduction decreased or avoided, then full-time farmers’ living standard 
would also be lowered, so that many of them would become part-time and absent farmers to earn 
higher off-farm income. If they could lease their insufficiently used or idled land (beyond family 
consumption need) to the fewer remaining full-time farmers, then the latter could achieve 
economies of scale, reduce costs and earn a living standard equivalent to that of off-farm income 
gainers. But because there is no such a measure to oblige the lease of the irrationally used land of 
the part-time and absent farmers to the full-time farmers, the latter would be forced to either 
abandon rice production (which is strategic to the country) or press the government to continue the 
high purchasing price and protectionism to guarantee them a high living standard (which is the 
result and reality). There is what has been indicated above, a coexistence of over-self-sufficiency, 
overproduction together with imports (revealing the uncompetitive or untrue self-sufficiency or 
over-self-sufficiency), as the domestically and externally unsalable surplus due to the higher costs 
has been accumulated into excessive inventory, while low cost products have to be imported. 
  As a comparison, the author also generates 13 features of the Chinese model of rural 
development. During 1978-83, mainland China contracted village collectively owned land in 
fragmented small forms to households for individual operation, while villages provided services and 
general management (feature 1 institutional changes for a small-scale farming and collective-
individual mixed economy) which aroused peasants’ incentives for production and released surplus 
labor to off-farm activities, and carried out government policies supporting rice production and rural 
development (feature 2), construction of rural infrastructure (feature 3), higher yields and multiple 
cropping of rice and other grains (feature 4), diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture (feature 5), 
off-farm employment (feature 6), peasant migration to cities and work in town and village firms 
(feature 7) and agricultural mechanization with small machinery (feature 8), which were similar to 
features 1-8 of the Japanese model. At the beginning of the 1980s, the irrational and polyopolistic 
land use by part-time and absent small farmers had also appeared. But China has then implemented 
effective and appropriate solutions to this obstacle as institutional changes for a large-scale farming 
and collective-individual mixed economy (feature 9 starting roughly around 1985), which made it 
possible to realize agricultural mechanization with large machinery (feature 10), earlier development 
in some (chiefly Eastern and coastal) rural areas, and its promotion in other (mainly Central and 
Western) areas especially from the early 1990s on (feature 11), introduction of more advanced 
technology and management, larger investment, and domestic and international markets to agriculture 
by urban-rural joint enterprises, and external and foreign single and joint ventures (feature 12), and 
prevention of food overproduction, promotion in quality and perfectization in variety of agricultural 
products, and improvement of the environment, while strengthening development of the Central and 
especially the Western areas (feature 13 mainly from mid-1999). (For more information, see Zhou 
2001: 7, 146, 184-5, Chapters 6-7) 
Consequently, in November 2001, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China 
has decided to form a free trade zone in 2010 (in which the tariff on rice will be reduced by 50% in 
2015) (WXC 2004). But Japan and South Korea could not join mainly because if they opened their 
agriculture markets, they would not stand the competition from the other countries with lower costs. 
Thus the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has 
become the root of their agricultural protectionism. 
Although Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia; Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and Bhutan and Nepal in South Asia are generally at the earlier 
phases of the Japanese model under private land ownership, irrational and polyopolistic land use by 
part-time and absent landowners has already happened, although to different extent, as rural labor   12
force has been induced to abandon agriculture (but not necessarily land ownership) to go to cities. In 
those rural areas where many peasants still rely on land for subsistence, there are also landowners 
who hold land without leasing it out. For example, India has made land reform so that large 
landowners no longer exist, but the medium- and small-sized landowners are allowed to lease land 
out and withdraw it after the termination of the leasing contract. It has not yet eliminated mass 
poverty and hunger in the rural areas. In the late 1990s, the government has embarked upon an 
ambitious target of doubling food production and making India hunger-free in 10 years. But even so, 
large amount of land is idled by absent landowners who have no intention of renting it out. (For more 
presentation, see Zhou 2001: 185-7). According to Chakrabarti (2001), the problem has been 
aggravated in many developing countries since the late 1990s as the WTO free agricultural trade 
agreement has made their agriculture more unprofitable and compelled more farmers to seek off-
farm income while idling land (e.g., in India), in front of the heavily subsidized exports and high 
tariffs of the developed countries (thus India together with other developing countries have been 
pressing the developed nations to reduce and abolish agricultural protectionism). Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam in Southeast Asia have transformed the former public land ownership under the centrally 
planned economy into a nominal state - but de facto private - land ownership, i.e., the state-owned 
land has been possessed by households permanently and the possession could be sold, and in 
Cambodia the residential land became privately owned and salable. This has resulted in both newly 
landless and irrational and polyopolistic land use. (For more analyses, see Zhou 2001: Chapter 8). At 
the same time, full-time farmers who love farming and still existent or appearing landless farmers 
who need land have had to cut trees and grasses to get land, hence damaging the environment.  
The general situation in Southeast Asia is summarized in the `Symposium Theme’ of the 
International Symposium (2002) in Chiang Mai, Thailand: `The dynamic economic and 
demographic development in many regions of Southeast Asia has brought about fundamental 
changes for rural areas and the agricultural sector. Rapid population growth, urbanization and 
increasing purchasing power of populations in more developed regions through industrialization 
induce changes in the quantity, quality and structure of food consumption. At the same time income 
disparities between urban centers and rural areas and among social/ethnic groups have risen. These 
developments tend to result in an overexploitation and degradation of natural resources, decreasing 
agricultural productivity and thus risks of rural livelihoods. Migration into urban centers and 
further encroachment of agriculture into marginal areas are on the rise creating a vicious circle of 
increasing poverty and destruction of natural resources.’ 
In Lebanon and Yemen of West Asia, according to Owaygen (2002) and Destremau (2001) 
respectively, land is privately owned, and many able-bodied male part-time and absent farmers 
went to earn higher income in cities or abroad, while leaving women to cultivate, hence land 
insufficient cultivation. Land idling is also serious. 
In Latin America, population living in the countryside dropped from 58% in 1950 to 25% in 
1995 (Abramovay [1996] 1997: 56). In general, land reform has been made only to a low extent, 
large land owners still dominate while most peasants have no or little land (Liu & Su 2002). There 
are even large landowners who idle land without leasing it to small or landless farmers for survival 
(Hunt 2003) because they are too rich and do not care about the low rent the poor tenants could 
afford to pay. Numerous small and landless peasants have thus been forced to migrate to cities, 
where many of them could find no regular jobs or no jobs at all, but just live in slums, with rising 
crimes (Liu & Su 2002). But even in places where the land reform has been made, of the new small 
landowners, while some have survived on the land, others sold land ownership or use rights and re-
became landless, and further others just idled land and migrated to cities (Carisio & Helmold 
Macieira 2004). Hence the irrational and polyopolistic land use has become a fundamental 
microeconomic root of the persisting poverty, inequality and injustice. 
For example, in Brazil of Southern Latin America, there has been a bimodal of large land 
estates and small farms. During 1972-96, those larger than 1,000 ha had reduced from 48.3% to 
45.1%, while those smaller than 100 ha increased from 16.4% to 20.4%, owing to the ongoing land   13
reform (OECD 1999-7: 21). But Abramovay [1996] (1997: 62-3) reports that `An FAO team noted 
that the most recent rural exodus, at least in the regions where family farming has a significant weight, 
mainly affects young people. This poses very serious succession problems although I have found no 
university research on this problem in Brazil. However, this is a subject which provokes increasing 
concern in the social movement, as it questions the ability of family farming to reproduce itself. This 
theme deserves much more attention from the researchers and international organizations dealing with 
rural development.’ Moreover, in the regions where family farming dominates, `self-employed 
professionals who live in towns often buy land from farmers in difficulty or from aged farmers.’ The 
State authorities of Santa Catarina were thus worried by not only `the prospect of a rural exodus 
involving young people’ but also `the destructive effect on rural communities of the systematic 
buying of lands by people who were not going to live on them (doctors, lawyers, etc.)’ (more 
appropriately, not going to carry out agricultural production on them). 
Although Brazil has been a net food exporter with over-self-sufficiency in absolute terms, 
hunger persists so that it has under-self-sufficiency in relative terms. Why do not the large producers 
reduce prices so as to let poor people in hunger afford to buy their foods? One of the main reasons 
would be that people in hunger are just too poor, so that if the prices were lowered to the levels 
affordable to them, they would be below the costs. (Carisio & Helmold Macieira 2004). But why do 
they even idle a part of the land without leasing it to the poor? One of the main reasons would still be 
that people in starvation are just too poor to pay high rents. Although the new President Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva since 1 January 2003 has launched a Hunger Zero campaign, as long as there are large 
and small landowners who neither cultivate nor lease land out, while full-time or landless peasants 
who need land for survival and competitiveness could not get it, hunger would not be easily wiped 
out, nor poverty, inequality and injustice. 
In Mexico of Northern Latin America, in the 20
th  century, `rural areas across the heartland 
have been sustained by’, `or thrived on, the earnings of men and women who temporarily migrated 
to the USA for work. Farmers in many parts of Central Mexico made temporary forays up north and 
used the money they earned to maintain their families back home.’ `Migrants also pooled their 
money and filled in for strapped or corrupt local governments by supporting public works projects 
that ranged from paving streets and installing portable water systems to refurbishing churches and 
furnishing classrooms with computers.’ `The abandonment of villages . . . would seem little more 
than an inevitable progression because declining federal agricultural subsidies have made it hard for 
the farming industry to support large numbers of small growers.’ (Thompson 2001: 2) 
`At the turn of a new century, however’, as the USA increased border control, `permanent 
emigration has squeezed parts of Mexico’s rural core to the verge of extinction. Officials in 
Michoacan State reported that the number of migrants leaving for the USA had increased to some 
50,000 people each year. About half of them move permanently to the USA’. `In village Casa 
Blanca, the families – usually fathers first, followed years later by their wives and children – have 
been swept north by the desperate torrent that carries floods of immigrants to the USA, leaving 
widening swaths of Central Mexico abandoned. In the 1990s, most of the 5,800 people once living 
in Casa Blanca have moved to Tulsa, Oklahoma. Fewer than 2,500 remain, and many of them have 
begun referring to this desert village as a ghost town.’ `Migration experts worry that having entire 
families and villages transplanted north of the border could pose serious economic consequences 
because incentives to send money home could wane.’ Thus, while President Vincente Fox `has been 
a vocal advocate for making the US-Mexican border more open to the free flow of Mexican 
workers, he has also said that he aims to carry out projects that would help lift rural areas out of 
poverty to encourage more Mexicans to stay home.’ In the week of 11-15 June 2001, `he 
inaugurated a micro-lending program aimed at supporting homespun businesses in the poorest 
regions of the country. But of the 2,000 people who lived in the Michoacan village of Huacao 10 
years ago, only 400 remain – nearly all of them are women, children too young to trek across the 
border or elderly people who feel too weary.’ (Thompson 2001: 2)   14
According to NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), from 1 January 2003 on, 
Mexico should open the agricultural markets to the USA. During the week of 16-22 December 
2002, the Lower House of the Mexican Parliament passed a resolution to ask the Upper House to 
abolish the NAFTA articles for such opening. In the afternoon of 26 December, the national 
‘Permanent Agricultural Delegates Congress’ issued an ultimatum to President Fox, demanding him 
to sign the ‘National Rural Agreement’ by 30 December, otherwise they would launch a campaign 
on 31 December to block the roads and harbors of the whole country to hamper the imports of the 
cheaper US agricultural goods. In the evening of the same day, he had to yield to them by agreeing 
to establish a dialogue mechanism with farmers’ organizations, assist farmers who suffer from the 
shocks of the cheaper imports to raise competitiveness and open markets, and sign the ‘National 
Rural Agreement’ which imitated the EU approach of providing subsidies, sanitary assistance, 
vocational training, legal consultation to farmers, thus temporarily resolving the crisis of resisting 
NAFTA. (TTNN 28 December 2002) 
Therefore, in Mexico, on one side, so much land is idled by the part-time and absent small 
farmers; while on the other, many farmers could not get land or increase farm size, achieve 
economies of scale, reduce costs and become viable or more competitive in front of the cheaper US 
imports, and have had to press the government to provide more subsidies. 
In mid-2003, the Mexican Ministry of the Environment and Natural Recourses released a 
report that the ecological environment in 70% of the country’s land and sea territory has been being 
destroyed, including 32 states and federal districts as the ‘highest dangerous zones’, and the 
economic losses of the country due to the deterioration of the ecological situation has amounted to 
67 billion US dollars each year. (Song, Xin-De 2003) 
The most prominent problem is forest devastation. According to official data, one century 
ago, the primeval and afforested forests covered 99% of the land territory, and forests even existed in 
some dry areas of the country. But during 1993-2000, over 7,890,000 ha of forests have sorrowfully 
disappeared. The forest area of the whole country in 2003 was about 142,000,000 ha, while the 
largest area of the destroyed forests annually reached 1,500,000 ha. By this speed, according to the 
Ministry of the Environment and Natural Recourses and other relevant agencies, in maximally 60 
years, the entire primeval forests would vanish, and in 127 years, all the forests and biological 
diversities would be gone. (Song, Xin-De 2003) 
The main causes of the forest destruction include (1) frequent forest fires due to lasting high 
temperatures; (2) rampant narcotic drug production (marijuana, opium poppy, etc.) which 
demanded for cutting trees for land; and (3) serious inefficient land use which forced those farmers 
who needed more land but could not get it from those who held it irrationally and polyopolistically, 
to slash forests to increase farm size, or create grazing land (Song, Xin-De 2003). Thus, the 
irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has also led 
to the environmental deterioration. 
In order to prevent the ecological environment from further worsening, the Mexican 
Parliament has promulgated a law on sustainable forest development and other pertinent laws, so as 
to control the land reclamation through destroying forests. The government has set up the National 
Forest Commission to implement the relevant laws and strengthen the consciousness of the public 
on the forest and environmental protection. (Song, Xin-De 2003) 
However, no measure has been taken to overcome the irrational and polyopolistic land use 
by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers. On one hand, as long as the full-time farmers 
need more land so as to be competitive or merely viable but could not get it from those who hold it 
in irrational and polyopolistic use, the danger that they might be forced to slash forests to increase 
farm size or create grazing land would exist. On the other, even if full-time farmers could be 
effectively prevented from doing so, how they could become competitive or merely viable now that 
they could not get land from those who hold it in irrational and polyopolistic use, remains an 
unresolved problem.   15
Lipton, ‘lead scholar’ for ‘Rural Poverty Report 2001’ of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (as he informs the author), asks (2003) ‘Why does the voluntary choice 
of Mexicans to better their chances by emigrating give cause for concern?’ Hopefully the above 
explanations have answered this question. He also argues that ‘Perhaps the land they are 
abandoning is bad or exhausted. Anyway, in a large-farm system its yield would be even less’. To 
this argument, the author would like to point out that ‘bad or exhausted’ land is not useless, and 
there could be farmers who are willing to cultivate and improve it. The author’s book cites two 
examples in China: ‘Bai Village of Baicun Township of Dingxiang County of Shanxi Province had 
3,073 mu (204.87 ha) of farmland. It reserved 112 mu (7.47 ha) of saline-alkali land for leasing to 
produce sorghum in the mid-1980s. The contract was for one year and renewable. The rent was 8,000 
yuan in total, 71.43 yuan per mu (0.067 ha) in 1987, but raised in 1988 to 11,000 yuan, 98.21 yuan 
per mu, by tendering among six farmers representing 20 households’ (Zhou 2001: 230). ‘In the mid-
1980s, in the areas formerly flooded by the Yongding River and areas with more sandy soil and fruit 
trees of Langfang Prefecture of Hebei Province, the village collectives could not provide effective 
services while single household operation was too weak, 1,135 joint households farms emerged, on 
average contracting 55 mu (3.67 ha) per farm. In 1986, nine households of Si-De Ren et al. contracted 
160 mu (10.67 ha) of land. All the nine principal laborers were experts, three for fruit trees, two for 
melons and vegetables, and four for grain. They gathered funds of 11,000 yuan, dug a motor-pumped 
well, built six farm houses, planted 4,000 fruit trees, produced grain and oil crops on 100 mu (6.67 
ha), melons and vegetables on 60 mu (4 ha), and could earn 18,000 yuan, 2,000 yuan per laborer’ 
(Zhou 2001: 250). Therefore, as long as other farmers wish to lease in the abandoned ‘bad or 
exhausted land’, they should be given access. If ‘its yield would be even less’ and the tenants could 
not survive or get profits on it, they would naturally quit. Now that ‘small farmers are rational’, they 
should be allowed to learn from their own experiences through ‘try and error’ to find their optimal 
farm size. It would be unnecessary and irrational to prohibit them from doing so. 
Of course, Mexico is a net exporter of agricultural goods and there are large and profitable 
farmers. But this cannot automatically get rid of the poverty from the many full-time small farmers 
and landless farmers who need land for becoming viable or more competitive. Therefore it would be 
necessary to give them access to the land irrationally and polyopolistically held by the part-time and 
absent small farmers. In so doing, at least poverty, inequality and injustice could be reduced. 
In Peru of Southern Latin America, according to Ganoza Roncal (2003), because the 
mountainous areas are poorer than the plain regions, numerous young farmers have abandoned 
agriculture in the mountains to replace the young farmers in the plain areas who had migrated to the 
cities, USA or Europe to earn higher incomes. It is worried that the next step of the newly arrived 
young farmers would be to leave the plain regions for the cities, USA and Europe too, just as 
already happened in Mexico and Brazil. 
In Egypt of North Africa, the rural areas are still less developed as `the poor are absolutely 
dependent on public services’, `simply because they do not have the means to acquire literacy, good 
health, adequate nutritional standards or irrigation facilities through the private sector’. However, 
there has been a shift from anti-poverty and equalitarian strategies towards economic growth and 
trade liberalization since 1985 as prompted by the World Bank and IMF. The 1952 land reform law 
of protecting tenants from eviction and guaranteeing a low level of land rent was repealed by the 
1993 law which permitted the land rent to be determined by the market forces from 1996-97 on. As 
a result, the production costs of small farmers increased, many landowners recovered land from 
numerous tenants who in turn became dependent on being hired as farm workers, their real wages 
declined, and land rent rose sharply. The share of small landowners of less than 2 ha decreased, 
while that of medium landowners of 10-20 ha increased. (El-Ghonemy [1996] 1997: 183-6). But the 
free market mechanism has not necessarily led to efficient land use: waste of cultivated land has 
already happened at such a low income stage, and become so serious that Vice Prime Minister and 
Minister of Agriculture Yousuf Amin Wali had to declare on 6 April 1998 that idling and wasting 
cultivated land was illegal, and each province had the power to stop such behavior by   16
administrative means (XHNA 1998). But no effective measures have been taken since, so that land 
idling has become more serious (Mansouri 2005). 
In Morocco, according to Mtilk (2005) and El Mouaatamid (2005), agricultural land is 
privately owned. An average family has three (rural areas maybe five) children. Equitable land 
inheritance among children (one share to sons and half a share to daughters so that after marriage a 
husband and wife would equally have 1.5 shares) has led to fragmentation. Rain plays an important 
role in agriculture. Due to no rain for years and poverty, many farmers left for towns or Europe. 
Then they got jobs there, and forgot farming skills, have no interest in, and could not easily return 
to, farming. Many of them have just idled land as absent farmers. Since the 1960s, the government 
has built many reservoirs, artificial lakes, and canals. However, even in the regions with enough 
water, there are part-time and absent private landowners who inefficiently use land. For example, a 
geographer who has received higher education and is working in the capital of Rabat, has a 
privately owned land in the Eljadida City of the Doukkala Region (about 200 km from Rabat) 
which has enough water supply and good soil. His parents do not work. But he neither cultivates 
nor leases out the land, a typical absent farmer. On the other hand, there exist many landless people 
who migrate to work in different farms and would like to lease in land. But under the belief that the 
use of privately owned land cannot be obliged, there is no measure by the government to oblige the 
idled land to be used rationally and competitively. 
Tunisia, according to Ahmed, Boufaroua, Kherreddine and Mansouri (2005), remains an 
agrarian country dominated by traditional agriculture. Following the independence from France in 
1964, the government turned the French-occupied land into state ownership and distributed it to 
farmers with no or little land for individual ownership. Now most land is privately owned, and the 
rest is owned by the state. The state leases the state owned land to able-bodied farmers for up to 15 
years with conditions for good cultivation. If they were not matched, the land would be taken back. 
But there is no punishment on the waste or under-utilization of the privately owned land. In fact, 
many able-bodied farmers have left for cities (e.g., living in Siliana city which is in the center of the 
country) or Europe, their old parents, wives and children cultivate land inefficiently. Land idling 
has also happened. Although there is land leasing (hamous) by able-bodied part-time and absent 
farmers, the rent being 20% of the revenue of the tenants, it is not often, because the part-time and 
absent landowners have strong linkage to their land even if they do not use it sufficiently. There are 
able-bodied full-time farmers who want to cultivate more land and landless farmers who wish to get 
land, but have no access to the idled or under-utilized private land.  
In Madagascar, Malawi, and Mauritius of Southeast Africa, according to Razafindravonona 
(2001), Thangata (2002) and Bhukuth (2001) respectively, land insufficient cultivation and idling 
by part-time and absent private landowners are serious. 
In the 11 countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo of West Africa, onchocerciasis (river blindness) has 
been one of the causes for depopulation and emigration from the ORZs (Onchocerciasis Reference 
Zones) during the 1960s-70s, which led the valleys to be abandoned. The OCP (Onchocerciasis 
Control Program) launched in 1974 by the World Bank, WHO, UNDP, FAO, etc., finally turned the 
ORZs into OFZs (Onchocerciasis-Freed Zones) in 1991. The OFZs and notably the valleys have 
been repopulated increasingly from the mid-1980s on. (CICRED 1999: 3, 29, 46, 111-5) 
In the latter half of the 1990s, FAO’s research in nine of these countries (without Guinea 
Bissau and Sierra Leone) (CICRED 1999: VIII, 3) finds that the land tenure system before the 
abandonment and after the recovery has always been in communal ownership, under the control of 
the elders of tribes/lineages. The new settlers are their tenants. (Ciparisse 25 February 2002). 
However, `in some cases, elders have sold pieces of land with or without the agreement of their 
lineage, to settlers, mainly due to the necessity/possibility of easy money gain for the elder owners; 
increased feeling that who directly farms could progressively acquire some de facto permanent rights 
on the piece of land where he/she settled; and local marriages’ (Ciparisse 13 March 2002).   17
`The unit engaged in agricultural production and commercialization is the household’, as `small 
holders’. The new settlers have been carrying out traditional agriculture, as `agriculture is not 
mechanized’, and `the prevailing production system is based on the principle of the extensive land 
occupation. The system, of course, is highly dependent on labor and incorporates few commercial 
inputs. Moreover, it presents the disadvantage of low yields per unit of cultivated areas since an 
increase in production depends more on extending the cultivated areas than on any real transition 
towards intensive production. This is especially the case in food producing areas.’ (CICRED 1999: IX, 
86, 92, 104) 
`Most of the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa are currently undergoing the highest 
population growth in the history. At the same time, migrations have increased and diversified.’ `The 
OFZs in West Africa are a good example of this type since they are not yet densely populated. They 
are experiencing high immigration flows’. `The most innovative information emerging from this 
research turned out to be the high degree of mobility of the young adults whose families had settled 
in the OCP valleys’. `Their young populations continue to emigrate to the capitals, towns or rural 
areas of neighboring countries or to Europe.’ `If the ways in which the valleys are being 
repopulated were to continue as they are today, this would lead to an increase in the proportion of 
women and children in the agricultural work force with consequent decline in production 
capacities.’ (CICRED 1999: VIII-IX, 11). The migration by male adults to other rural areas is 
usually for producing cash crops which are more profitable than cereals (Ciparisse 13 May 2002), 
while that to cities is for off-farm activities, which are even more lucrative than cash crop 
production. Hence the appearance of the irrational and poliopolistic land use by able-bodied part-
time and absent small farmers in low income countries still saddled with traditional agriculture and 
developing towards the high income economy under both public and private land ownership. 
In Mauritania, according to Mbodj (2005), rice, wheat, sorghum and millet are the main 
foods. Most land is owned publicly, by the state, tribes (mainly in the north), or local communities 
(governed by big families, chiefly in the south). The rest of the land is owned individually. 
Individuals may buy land from the state, tribes and local communities. Some individuals have 
owned large areas of land and employed farm workers. Much land in the north is deserted, equal to 
about two thirds of the country’s territory. In the south, there is enough water and good soil, but 
inefficiently used. There are part-time and absent farmers and also full-time farmers. According to 
the regulations, land unused for five-10 years may lead to its taking over by the state. But in 
practice, such punishment has not been implemented. Leasing is allowed, but has not been carried 
out often. Thus land under-utilization is very serious. The other main problems in agriculture are the 
lack of financing, machinery, and help for sale in the market. As a result, none of the main foods is 
self-sufficient. The imported foods are twice more than the domestically produced. Sorghum and 
millet are mainly imported from the neighboring countries. Foreign aid has not included any 
measure on the efficient land use. There is no civil war. The government does not have much power 
over the tribes and local communities, which are powerful. Thus the tribes and local communities 
may oblige the efficient land use if they realized its importance.  
In certain African countries, the governments do not allow land leasing, in fear that if it were 
allowed then the private landowners could go to cities to earn higher off-farm income while idling 
land (Mikos 2004). These governments have neglected that the prohibition of land leasing cannot 
prevent the private landowners from becoming part-time and absent to work in cities, while still 
insufficiently using or idling their land. Therefore the correct way shall be to permit land leasing 
and give full-time farmers the right to lease in the insufficiently used land beyond the family 
consumption of the landowners, so that those landowners who would like to earn high off-farm 
income could do so, while their land could be used in a rational and competitive way. 
CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries - 15 in total) and NIS (Newly Independent 
States of the former Soviet Union or CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States – 12 in whole), since 
the early 1990s, have implemented land privatization or farm restructuring mainly by (1) restitution 
of land to former private owners, and (2) distribution of individual land (and asset) shares for   18
private ownership or private possession in public ownership to farm members. Individual land 
owners or possessors then had the choice to either set up individual farms, or remain in the 
collectively operated large farms. In Poland and former Yugoslavia, about 80% of agricultural land 
have always remained at private land ownership after WWII. 
As a result, on one hand, in domain 1 (individual or private farms), numerous able-bodied 
part-time and absent farmers earning higher off-farm income tend to hold fragmented small farms in 
irrational and polyopolistic use without selling or leasing them to the full-time farmers (most land 
rented out is from the governments, some city dwellers who were restituted land but only till a small 
part for subsistence due to the lack of experience and capital to establish their own farms, and some 
old and single female peasants). Land market has not been activated by the free market mechanism. 
The remaining full-time farmers could not easily increase farm size or receive necessary community 
services. These were findings by the World Bank in Croatia, Armenia, and Georgia in 1996, Poland 
in 2000, and in CEECs-NIS in general in 1997; by OECD in Albania and Kazakhstan in 1998, and 
Slovenia in 2000; and by IAMO in CEECs-NIS in general in 1999, etc. On the other, many large 
farm members voluntarily remain in collective land operation (domain 2). Some landowners have 
got physical parcels (which are typically fragmented as a combination of good, bad, nearby and 
distant parcels for equity among landowners) and rented them back to large farms (mainly because 
they possess more facilities and provide more services). Some others (in NIS) have obtained paper 
shares from a large farm and only upon quitting can they be given physical parcels (which may 
usually be fragmented). In either case, the large farm has distributed the gathered private land to 
groups of employees for operation, which, although benefiting from collective services, is a 
continuation of the operation system under the centrally planned economy and keeps the individual 
incentives low. Such collectively operated large farms (typically in the NIS) usually also assign 
small household plots to members for individual operation (which proves efficient, demonstrating 
the possibility of successful family operation upon larger land). This is a Dual Land System. (For a 
detailed presentation on both domains 1 and 2, see Zhou 2001: 399-430). In fact, the percentage in 
agricultural land by collectively operated large farms, due to their low individual incentives and 
ineffective management, has been declining across CEECs-NIS (SYCSEEC 2002: 93-4), and 
domain 2 is in transition towards domain 1 as some landowners have been persuaded to withdraw 
land from the collectively operated large farms for individual farming (Lerman: 2003). Thus, the 
imperative task shall be to foster domain 1 by overcoming the irrational and polyopolistic land use 
of able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers and, upon this basis, strengthening community’s 
promotion of full-time individual farmers and sustainable rural development.  
Land idling happened too. For example, Russia has privatized land ownership since 1991. 
But, in the meeting of the State Council on 22 April 2002, President Putin told the Governors of the 
89 Republics that in the past 10 years, about 18 million ha of cultivated land, equal to the territory 
of France, had been idled (XHNA 2002). Thus Russia passed a law in 2002 to allow land sale and 
lease to individual nationals, and land lease (up to 49 years) but not sale to foreigners, hoping such 
created land market could lead to efficient land use (Lee Myers 2002. Lee Myers 2002). But the 
situation has not been improved and that law remains on paper according to Petrikov (2004). 
As Table 1 displays, by 2002, most CEE accession countries of the EU had given trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies at a higher level (around 20%) than the WTO standard. After 
joining the EU in May 2004, they started to receive higher protectionism than before (although 
lower than the EU-15 level) and encountered overproduction immediately in the same year. The EU 
bears an even higher level (about 35%). In fact, how to overcome the irrational and polyopolistic land 
use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has become the key in the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) reform for both the EU-15 and new accession countries. However, this key has 
been largely neglected. For example, the EU agricultural support to its CEE accession countries has 
focused on early retirement, young farmers, training, infrastructure, land consolidation, credits, fine 
seeds, better quality, higher yields, machinery, organic farming, environment protection, processing 
and marketing of products, rural tourism, etc. (SAPARD 2000). But no effective measure has been   19
taken on the fundamental issue - to overcome the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied 
part-time and absent small farmers (actually such measure has not been included in the aid programs to 
the developing countries by the developed nations and developing countries themselves, international 
organizations, NGOs, etc. across the world). According to the EU, it is the old farmers who 
inefficiently use land (but actually they are more willing to lease land out), while able-bodied 
farmers use land efficiently. It is thus not a surprise that while old farmers have been paid for early 
retirement and transferring land to young farmers, much land is irrationally and polyopolistically 
used by many able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers in the accession countries.  
In Western Europe, at the under-self-sufficiency stage, effective (but not necessarily 
appropriate) laws were implemented in Germany (1915), the UK (1947), Norway (1955) and 
Denmark (1989) to oblige the lease of the inefficiently used land of the part-time and absent farmers 
to full-time farmers for sufficient production, and in the EU (1963) and Italy (1978) to give right to 
farmers to cultivate any insufficiently produced land. But at the overproduction stage, such laws 
met a fundamental dilemma: if landowners were still obliged to either produce sufficiently on their 
land or lease it out for so doing, there would be overproduction; if not, much land would be used 
inefficiently, then how to make full-time farmers achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, become 
viable or more competitive in front of other countries with larger farm size and lower costs, and 
keep basic self-sufficiency in cereals at the EU level? Without a solution, the EU implemented 
protectionism, which made its farmers less competitive, harmed its consumers and taxpayers and 
the developing countries. Thus in July 2002 the EU had proposed a complete decoupling, but could 
not avoid the consequent production abandonment and loss of basic self-sufficiency in cereals, so 
that in June 2003 it retreated to allow to keep the coupling which causes overproduction. Therefore 
the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has been 
the fundamental root of protectionism and overproduction of the EU. (For details see later part). 
In the USA, small farmers have been being crowded out of agriculture by large farmers and 
their number has been declining ever since 1935. But the development in recent decades of off-farm 
employment pursued as subordinate to the loss-making independent small farming has resulted in 
irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers. This has 
indeed slowed the process of small farmers' exiting farming, but not halted it. In order not to be 
squeezed out of agriculture, the part-time and absent small farmers could raise their income by 
leasing out their irrationally and polyopolistically used land for other farmers to achieve economies 
of scale, or they themselves could lease in such land to become large farmers, forming part 
ownership. Indeed some small farmers, including African Americans who are the weakest of this 
group, have succeeded in becoming competitive large farmers by renting in a part of land. But in 
general only old and single female small farmers are willing to lease land out. Even the US 
Department of Agriculture which has been trying to help small farmers to acquire land and increase 
farm size, has stuck to the way for them to purchase land, and neglected to promote leasing. On the 
other hand, protectionism and consequent overproduction have also persisted in the USA. (For 
details, see Zhou 2001: 313-32, 370-84). Such phenomena exist in Canada too (see Zhou 2001: 397-
8). There are also irrational and polyopolistic land use and production abandonment by part-time 
and absent small farmers in Australia (Cornhill 2004. Pyne 2004) and New Zealand (Payton 2004).  
But the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand do not have the worry of losing basic self-
sufficiency in cereals because the earlier immigrants had formed the largest farms of the world with 
much lower costs which can easily feed their small populations and compete with other countries. 
Thus they have not exercised obligation on the part-time and absent small farmers to lease their 
irrationally and polyopolistically used land to the full-time farmers. In the USA, the main root of 
protectionism is in its political system: in order to get more votes, politicians yield to farmers’ 
pressure for higher incomes and larger overseas markets, rather than due to the concern of losing 
basic self-sufficiency in cereals caused by the irrational and polyopolistic land use of part-time and 
absent small farmers (Francis 2004). In Canada, the main reason of protectionism is to protect its   20
domestic markets for higher incomes of the farmers (Mackay & Leduc 2004). But New Zealand and 
Australia have generally speaking not implemented protectionism. (See Table 1) 
The above evidences have shown that the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-
bodied part-time and absent small farmers has indeed been a global problem under both public and 
private land ownership, with both traditional and modern agriculture, on both fragmented small and 
consolidatorily enlarged land, in both low and high income economies, at both stages of food under-
self-sufficiency and overproduction, and within both developing and developed countries. Schultz, 
as his many citations reveal, is well informed of the historical and contemporary agricultural 
situations of Japan ([1964] 1983: 4, 13, 21, 105, 124, 162, 181, 187, 190-1) and China ([1964] 
1983: 21, 48-9, 61, 106). It is thus a surprise that when publishing the book in 1964 he does not 
notice that this problem had emerged in Japan since 1960 (and even earlier), and reprinted it in 
1983 without changing views when it had become serious at least in Japan, Taiwan Province of 
China, South Korea, and emerged in mainland China, and been widely reported. 
 
(II) Existence of Economies of Scale in Agriculture 
Schultz ([1964] 1983: 9-10) also claims that the tenet `that the costs of agricultural products fall as 
the size of the production unit in agriculture increases' (which is his definition of the economies of 
scale in agriculture) has `no logical basis'. But even he himself ([1964] 1983: 122-3) has admitted 
that `Where human effort (labor) is cheap relative to the price of other agricultural factors, a one-
man (or family) farm may be efficient with a small garden-type tractor; on the other hand, where 
human effort is relatively dear, a one-man farm may be efficient with a combination of two or even 
three tractors that differ in size and type.' However, `It requires very special conditions for a fleet of 
big tractors to be efficient, conditions which in fact rarely exist.' Apparently, large farm size is such 
a condition. But the rare existence of such conditions does not mean that this tenet has `no logical 
basis'. Actually, in `a high income economy in which the demand for farm products is of slow 
growth', and `the labor force required for farming begins to decline at a substantial rate and many of 
the farm people . . . leave agriculture . . . for nonfarm jobs' (Schultz [1964] 1983: 15), increase of farm 
size of the remaining full-time farmers would already be logically possible, and could be realized if 
the irrational and polyopolistic land use by the able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers could 
be overcome. 
Schultz ([1964] 1983: 9-10, 17-8) further declares that this tenet has not `stood the test of time' 
and `empirical findings'. His empirical findings are that large-scale farming did not play a role in the 
excellent growth of agricultural production during 1952-59 in Western Europe, which was an `old, 
crowded workshop with a population density much greater than Asia's, and with a poor endowment of 
farm land generally'. However, the fragmented small farms were efficient in a low wage economy 
when there was little off-farm employment and labor was cheaper than large machinery, such as in 
some Western European countries and Japan during the recovery period after WWII and China during 
the initial reform period (1978 - mid-1980s) (concrete evidence is in Zhou 2001: 7; 123-7 for Japan; 
191-209 for China). But in a high wage economy when large amount of labor has been absorbed by 
off-farm activities, and large machinery has thus become cheaper than labor, that tenet would 
function, as evidenced by Japan, China, some CEECs and NIS, EU, Australia, New Zealand, Canada 
and, in particular, Schultz’s home country USA (detailed factual analysis is in Zhou 2001: 128-31 for 
Japan; 248-77 for China; 344-52, 378-80 for the USA). Therefore, unfortunately, it shall be Schultz's 
assertion that has not `stood the test of time' and `empirical findings' in the high income economy. 
 
(III) Role of Human Capital in Agricultural Growth
12 
It is significant for Schultz to raise the concept of human capital ([1964] 1983: 136, 176, 186), 
‘Capital goods are always treated as produced means of production. But in general the concept of 
capital goods is restricted to material factors, thus excluding the skills and other capabilities of man 
                                                 
12 In (Zhou 2001: 16-9, 70-1) the author has stated the correct opinions, but without mentioning the wrong views of 
Schultz criticized in this sub-section.   21
that are augmented by investment in human capital’, and to emphasize the importance of 
investments in human capital which ‘are of several forms; schooling, on-the-job training, and 
investments in health rank high’, ‘schooling is the largest and most easily comprehended of the 
components of human capital’. 
But, although Schultz admits ([1964] 1983: 22) that ‘It would be a mistake to infer . . . that 
the efficient allocation of land in farming and investments in structures that became a part of the 
land do not count’, he stresses ([1964] 1983: 22-3) that ‘It would be correct to infer, however,  . . . 
that improvements in the quality of the material factors employed in farming and in the capacities 
of farm people count much more than land.’ He further explains ([1964] 1983: 176), ‘The central 
argument of this study has set the stage for human capital as a major source of economic growth 
from agriculture. It runs as follows: The economic basis of the slow growth of a penny economy is 
not to be found generally in observable inefficiencies in the way the traditional agricultural factors 
of production are allocated’. ‘The key to growth is in acquiring and using effectively some modern 
factors of production’, ‘these modern factors are often concealed by economists under an expository 
contrivance called “technological change”’. Therefore, he believes that investment in material 
capital and human capital in farming (within technological changes) counts much more than 
allocative efficiency of land (within institutional changes), and investment in human capital is the 
key to agricultural growth. According to his definition of efficiency as cited at the beginning of this 
paper, the ‘efficient allocation of land in farming’ should naturally mean  the allocation of land in 
farming to those who can ‘produce the same output with fewer resources or a larger output from 
the same resources’ from those who cannot.  
The author does not deny the importance of investment in human capital and, broadly 
speaking, technological changes. But it would be inappropriate to raise it to be higher than that of 
the allocative efficiency of land and, generally speaking, institutional changes. The author holds 
that institutional changes (in particular allocative efficiency of land) are more fundamental and 
count much more than technological changes (especially investment in human capital). If the 
institutional barriers could not be removed dynamically, then technological changes (including 
investment in human capital) could not function well if at all; thus it is the institutional changes 
which are the keystone to agricultural growth. The following stages may be perceived. 
1. ‘Growth not dependent on additional schooling.’ ‘They include growth from the opening 
up of new farm land’ in ‘The settlement by Europeans and their descendents of the Americas and 
Australia and New Zealand’ which ‘called for much brute human force and for some capital goods 
to farm the new land’; ‘from water for irrigation provided mainly by public bodies’ ‘to use by 
illiterate farmers’ in India; ‘and from the mechanization of field crops made possible by skilled 
mechanics imported from other sectors or recruited from agriculture and trained specially to operate 
and repair machinery’ in the Soviet Union. ‘They also include some growth from the adoption and 
effective use of new agricultural factors that are profitable when only a few adjustments are 
required of farmers’, referring ‘to hybrid corn as an example’ ‘in Punjab, India’; and ‘when new 
markets for farm products make it profitable to expand production’, e.g., ‘as a consequence of the 
cotton price supports by the United States which, during the early post-World War II period, gave 
cotton-exporting countries a lager part of the world market (and a stable price for cotton).’ (Schultz 
[1964] 1983: 178-80, 187-8). Apparently, availability of farm land is a pre-requisite even for 
growth not dependent on additional schooling, as farmers could not achieve growth upon no land. 
Therefore, institutional barriers should have been resolved to the extent that farmers at least have 
some land to till, be it large areas in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union, 
or fragmented small farms in India. Here, although Schultz ([1964] 1983: 178-9) notes that for ‘The 
settlement by Europeans and their descendents of the Americas and Australia and New Zealand’ 
which ‘called for much brute human force and for some capital goods to farm the new land’, ‘The 
principal explanatory variable was the rapid increase in the supply of farm land’, he has neglected 
that it was after the land reform following the American Revolution through the War for 
Independence from Britain (1775-83) which abolished the feudalistic quit-rents (paid to absentee   22
landlords in England in exchange for the use right of their land by farmers in the Atlantic coastal 
areas), prohibition of settlement west of the Alleghenies to protect British land speculators, and tax on 
the trade of the colonial farm products, that the English settlers could advance into the West; and it 
was after the Civil War (1861-65) which eradicated the slave system that the individual land 
ownership could be established in the South (see Zhou 2001: 333-4). 
2. ‘Growth dependent on additional schooling. In general, where technically superior factors 
of production are a principal source of agricultural growth, schooling counts. This proposition also 
implies that this source of growth is no longer restricted to the adoption of only a simple new factor, 
but requires the successful adoption of a complex of such agricultural factors, and, furthermore, the 
adoption process is a long, continuing one’ (Schultz [1964] 1983: 189). At this stage, Schultz 
([1964] 1983: 196-7) is correct at realizing ‘Political handicaps. There are two major political 
factors that account for much of the observable under-investment in farm people and one such 
factor that causes serious disinvestment in these forms of human capital. They are as follows: (1) 
where large landowners are powerful politically, it is to be expected that they will have a strong 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo; (2) where poor countries are committed to investment 
in industry as the basic approach in achieving economic growth, agricultural skills and knowledge 
are neglected; (3) where ideology requires the elimination of private property in land and in other 
(material) means of production, farm people become strictly farm workers and their entrepreneurial 
skills are lost.’ 
  However, here Schultz is also wrong as he holds a static view as if once the three political 
handicaps or institutional barriers have been removed, then investment in material and human 
capital (within technological changes) will count much more than allocative efficiency of land 
(within institutional changes), and investment in human capital will become the key to agricultural 
growth. He ignores that the removal of institutional barriers should be dynamic, and in particular, 
there has appeared a fourth political handicap or institutional barrier: irrational and polyopolistic 
land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers as the low income economy develops 
towards the high income economy, which will require a second round institutional reform, 
otherwise the investment in material and human capital would not function well if at all. 
Concerning political handicap (1), Japan constitutes a typical example. Schultz ([1964] 
1983: 181, 186-7) claims, ‘There is next the issue of investment in farm people associated with little 
or no favorable effects on agricultural production. It is hard to discern any clear-cut historical cases 
that support this kind of relationship.’ ‘But there are apparently none in which better schooling of 
farm people who continue at farming is associated with a stagnant agriculture.’ ‘There are all 
manner of historical clues indicating that there has been a strong positive relation between the level 
of skills and knowledge of farm people and their productivity at farming.’ ‘When does schooling 
matter in farming? Increases in yield per acre over time from the adoption, first by producers in one 
country and then in other countries, of new yield-increasing inputs strongly imply that a widespread 
adoption of such inputs’, and ‘in the case of growing rice, or of corn, differences in schooling may 
be a major explanatory factor.’ ‘The differences in rice yields correspond closely with the 
differences in the schooling of rice growers. In countries where the level of this schooling is high, 
rice yields are also high. The new combination of inputs that accounts for the large increases in rice 
yields in particular countries, notably in Japan, have not been adopted by rice growers in those 
countries where the farm people who grow rice are predominantly illiterate.’ Schultz is dealing with 
agricultural growth. But he is not aware that the high rice yields of farmers with schooling would 
not naturally be turned into high output of rice of the whole country to reach at least basic self-
sufficiency, nor automatically be associated with low costs of rice production. As mentioned above, 
in Japan, after the land reform in 1946-50 to remove political handicap (1), rural education has been 
strengthened and farmers have indeed developed high-yielding technology. But since 1960, because 
much land has been irrationally and polyopolistically used by able-bodied part-time and absent 
small farmers (who have also been well educated either in agricultural or other sciences), full-time 
farmers could not easily increase farm size to reduce costs, rice self-sufficiency could not be   23
maintained without extremely distorted government protectionism which then led to artificial 
overproduction, and, loss of self-sufficiency after the Japanese domestic market was forced by the 
GATT (WTO) and USA to be opened (although at a low extent) in 1994, and since then its basic 
rice self-sufficiency has still be maintained with heavy state protectionism. The Japanese model has 
been repeated by Taiwan Province of China and South Korea. In fact, farmers in Japan and Taiwan 
Province have transferred and applied their advanced technologies in mainland China (TTNN 16 
December 2002) because it has found effective and appropriate ways to transfer the land irrationally 
and polyopolistically used by the able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers to the full-time 
farmers including external and foreign ones. Interesting enough, advanced large agricultural 
machinery made in Japan could not find much use in itself, but be imported into China as it is able 
to achieve economies of scale. (For more information see Zhou 2001: 258-9, 263, 283) 
Regarding political handicap (2), in the recent decades, poor countries have been 
increasingly attaching importance to agricultural skills and knowledge, rather than committing 
themselves to investment in industry as the basic approach in achieving economic growth. Even so, 
their efforts could not lead to expected results due to the obstacle of the irrational and polyopolistic 
land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers. Mexico is a case in point. Schultz 
([1964] 1983: 193) mentions that ‘No doubt Mexican nationals working in the United States gain 
much from the on-the-job training they acquire. Meanwhile, many higher skills can presently be 
had by Mexicans more cheaply at home than abroad by attending one of Mexico’s technological 
institutes’. Sarcastically and unfortunately, on the large areas of land whose production (but not 
necessarily ownership) has been abandoned by the able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers 
emigrating temporarily or permanently to the USA as above-cited, the higher skills of themselves or 
other farmers (who cannot have access to such land) learned at home and abroad could not be used. 
As for political handicap (3), China and CEECs-NIS are illustrating. As above-presented, 
both have reformed the former centrally planned economy into a market economy: China contracted 
the village owned land to households for operation during 1978-83, while CEECs-NIS made land 
privatization or farm-restructuring in the early 1990s. Afterwards, however, irrational and 
polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has appeared in both, 
which has hampered the full-time farmers with entrepreneurial skills from increasing farm size, 
achieving economies of scale, reducing costs, becoming viable or more competitive. 
Therefore, when Schultz ([1964] 1983: 195) stresses ‘an optimum allocation of resources 
available for investment not only among capital goods but importantly also between such goods and 
the capabilities of people’ (i.e., between material capital and human capital), he neglects that there 
is a need for an optimum allocation of land between part-time/absent small farmers and full-time 
farmers and this fundamentally counts much more than the optimum allocation of investment 
between material capital and human capital. 
As the author (Zhou 2001: 16-9) presents, agricultural production is a function of many 
variables including institutions, technologies, policies, prices, production structures, labor, capital, 
education, health, weather, etc. These variables, however, play different roles. 
  According to Oshima (1987: 47, 53), in previous studies of development theories and 
strategies, the growth of per capita product was explained as owing to either proximate sources or 
ultimate causes. There was a tendency to group various inputs into the category of sources (labor, 
capital, education, structural changes, etc.); and to group the explanations of changes in the 
productivity of inputs into the category of causes, the major ones being changes in institutions and 
technologies. Oshima himself (1987: 5-6) studies the underlying long-term ultimate causes that 
sustain economic growth by assuming that growth is largely the outcome of the interplay of 
institutional and technological changes, as emphasized by Kuznets (1966), and finds that it is the 
institutional component that is the most important in the interaction of institutions and technologies 
underlying the growth of developing countries. Examples of the institutional changes are land 
tenure reforms from the feudal landlord ownership to individual land ownership (such as in Japan   24
during 1946-50), and from the centrally planned economy to family-based operation (such as in 
China during 1978-83). 
  The author (Zhou 2001: 70-1) has presented technological efficiency - a production plan is 
(technologically) efficient if there is no way to produce more output with the same inputs or to 
produce the same output with less inputs, as Varian argues (1992: 4). 
Static or short-run technological efficiency could be attained without changing technologies 
but with higher incentives and/or better division and coordination of labor through institutional 
changes. It could also be reached by adopting already invented more advanced technologies which 
were not used before peasants gained incentives and/or achieved better division and coordination of 
labor. For example, the land reform and setting-up of cooperatives in Japan during 1946-50 gave huge 
incentives and better division and coordination of labor to peasants, and the land tenure reform in 
China during 1978-83 also highly motivated farmers. They increased production quickly with the 
already used technologies, and then adopted the existing more advanced technologies unused before. 
(For details, see Zhou 2001: 70-1; for Japan 123-7; for China 17-8, 205-9) 
Dynamic or long-run technological efficiency needed for achieving sustainable growth 
depends heavily on the technological progress embodied in the construction of rural infrastructure 
(including education as the main form of investment in human capital); higher yields and multiple 
cropping of rice and other cereals; diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture; off-farm 
employment; peasant migration to cities and work in town and village firms; agricultural mechaniza-
tion with small machinery (features 3-8 in the Japanese and Chinese models) which would take longer 
time (e.g., finding a higher yielding variety of rice, building a big dam, transforming a desert, or 
educating peasants may cost several years). (See Zhou 2001: 71; for Japan 125-7; for China 18, 291-
2, Chapters 6-7) 
But once production has reached the frontier permitted by the established institutions, even 
though increases of production or reduction of costs are still technologically possible (through 
agricultural mechanization with large machinery), they tend to be hampered by vested interests, just 
as the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers in 
feature 9 of the Japanese model has suggested. At this stage, in an evolutionary approach, a second 
round of institutional changes is needed to allow sustainable rural development. Just because this 
obstacle has been overcome as in feature 9 of the Chinese model around the mid-1980s, further 
technological progresses embodied in agricultural mechanization with large machinery; regional 
transfer of development; introduction of more advanced technology and management, larger 
investment, and domestic and international markets to agriculture by urban-rural joint enterprises, and 
external and foreign single and joint ventures; and prevention of overproduction and improvement of 
the environment (features 10-13 in the Chinese model) could be realized. Therefore, Barker, Herdt 
and Rose (1985: 157) conclude that of so many variables for rural development, the institutional 
changes are the keystone. (See Zhou 2001: 18-9; for Japan 131-46; for China 209-94) 
 3.  Coexistence of growth not dependent and that dependent on additional schooling. Schultz 
asserts ([1964] 1983: 183), ‘it is true that programs to improve the skills and knowledge and health 
of workers were generally not a pre-requisite to the advances made during this phase of the 
Industrial Revolution. Why, then, should schooling be essential today? The answer lies in the fact 
that poor countries now entering upon industrialization are not employing the simple, primitive 
machinery and equipment of a century or two ago. Nor could they do so even if they wished to, 
because such things have become collectors’ items for museums.’ Here, Schultz has ignored the 
existence or persistence of the dual economy, i.e., modern industry mainly in cities and traditional 
agriculture in rural areas (see Zhou 2001: for monsoon Asia 35, 54, 185-7, 297, 302-4; for China 17-
8). Thus, ‘The simple, primitive machinery and equipment of a century or two ago’ have been 
employed not only still in 1964 (such as in China), but even now (such as in Africa as above-
mentioned), and not yet completely become collectors’ items for museums. Of course, it does not 
mean schooling is not important today. But availability of farm land irrationally and   25
polyopolistically used by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers to full-time farmers has 
increasingly become more essential. 
Schultz ends his book by claiming ([1964] 1983: 205), ‘in sum and substance, the man who 
is bound by traditional agriculture cannot produce much food no matter how rich the land. Thrift 
and work are not enough to overcome the niggardliness of this type of agriculture. To produce an 
abundance of farm products requires that the farmer has access to and has the skill and knowledge 
to use what science knows about soils, plants, animals, and machines.’ He is not aware that access 
to land is more fundamental as the rational and competitive land use is the basis of sustainable 
agricultural and rural development, without which, other agriculture-promoting measures (early 
retirement, young farmers, training, infrastructure, land consolidation, credits, fine seeds, better 
quality, higher yields, localized production, small and large machinery, organic farming, 
environmental protection, information, market access, etc.) would not function well (if at all), and 
the development of off-farm activities would even weaken the agricultural sector. 
 
(IV) Imbedded Influence of the Five Assertions of Schultz 
But the author’s views against the above-mentioned five assertions of Schultz do not as yet seem like 
a commonplace idea. This is mainly because `Schultz’s arguments have had a substantial impact on 
some of the economists who are actively involved with structural aspects of public policies and with 
project evaluation’ (Bowman 1983); `The notion that “farmers’ behavior is rational” has been 
recognized and accepted by Western economists in general since the publication of Schultz’s 
Transforming Traditional Agriculture’ (Lin, Justin Yi-Fu 1988: 63); `It has had a significant effect 
upon economic research and thinking about agriculture in low income countries, and it has had an 
effect upon what governments and international agencies have done with respects to agricultural 
policies'; `If this seems like a commonplace idea, it is so because of the writings of T. W. Schultz.' 
(Johnson 1983). The above-mentioned assertions of Schultz have become so imbedded a 
commonplace idea, that many economists do not even appeal to or mention him, while his influence 
could be clearly seen.  
For instance, although Lerman and his World Bank colleagues had found just to the contrary 
in Croatia, Armenia and Georgia in 1996 (as above-cited), he (1999: 20) still has the belief that free 
market forces could effect the transfer of land irrationally and polyopolistically used by the able-
bodied part-time and absent small farmers to the full-time farmers, as if they were rational and 
competitive enough to automatically and voluntarily make such transfers in the land markets:  
 
Once land has been allocated to individuals through the various processes of restitution and 
distribution, the new owners may immediately sense a need for adjustment of their holdings. Some 
landowners have no inclination to farm their land: they are too old, too frail, have better jobs outside 
agriculture, or do not have sufficient knowledge to become successful farmers. The optimal course of 
action for these landowners may be to get rid of their land. Other individuals, who know how to farm 
efficiently, may wish to increase their holdings in order to achieve higher earnings and greater welfare. 
The optimal course of action for these individuals is to acquire more land. The land market provides a 
meeting place where both groups of agents may enter into appropriate transactions for adjustment of 
land-holdings through transfer of ownership rights (buying and selling of land) or use rights (leasing of 
land). The economic role of land markets as a stage for farm size optimization explains the 
considerable interest in this issue in transitional economies, where the new farm sizes are decided 
abruptly and quite arbitrarily through administrative and political processes. 
 
Although without mentioning Schultz, Lerman and these transitional economies have 
evidently been deeply influenced by his allegations.
13  Another example is that in the above-
                                                 
13  Fortunately, in commenting the earlier version of this paper presented in the UNESCO Seminar `Poverty and 
Sustainable Development' in Bordeaux, France 22-23 November 2001, Lerman has actually recognized that his above-
cited view is not compatible with the world-wide evidences and turned to be positive to the author’s proposals to solve 
the problems, for which the author is most grateful.   26
mentioned International Symposium (2002) in Chiang Mai, Thailand, a senior Indonesian 
economist Dillon states to the author that whatever peasants do, they are correct and have good 
reasons. He further specifies (2002): ‘In the sixties, Schultz's research in India proved "small but 
efficient". Since then there have very many studies showing that farmers are generally very close to 
"allocative efficiency" although they might be quite distant to "technical efficiency"’. Apparently, 
he and the authors of the ‘very many studies’ have also been imbedded with Schultz’s assertions, so 
that they do not notice the allocative inefficiency of the able-bodied part-time and absent small 
farmers with their irrational and polyopolistic land use while full-time farmers could not have 
access to their land. 
Similarly, in the view of Commentators EA1 & EA2 (2005), ‘Certainly there are inefficient 
land uses across the world, but not only one cause’. As explained in the author’s 2001 book and 
2003 Cambridge Conference paper and developed in this paper, after the land reform of distributing 
land from large owners for equitable small individual ownership, when off-farm activities were 
rare, farmers would tend to efficiently use land, even though many rural facilities were still 
backward. The best examples were the immediate agricultural growth in Japan after the land reform 
of 1946-50 and in China after the economic reform of 1978-83. Of course, the rural facilities should 
be developed, otherwise they would cause inefficient land use. But following the development of 
off-farm activities, many able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers earning high off-farm 
income would have no willingness to lease even the land beyond their family consumption need to 
the remaining fewer full-time farmers. This problem has been increasingly serious in Japan ever 
since 1960 while the rural facilities have been well established. Similarly, one may not say that the 
rural facilities are backward in the present EU-15. But if the coupling and other protectionist 
policies were all abolished, production abandonment caused by the refusal to lease land to the full-
time farmers by the part-time and absent small landowners at low rents would happen. Therefore, 
after the development of off-farm activities, the irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied 
part-time and absent small farmers has become the most fundamental cause of the inefficient land 
use when the rural facilities are backward (such as in many developing countries currently) and the 
unique cause when the rural facilities are advanced (such as in many developed countries presently. 
In a democratic society, if a view were found as inappropriate, it would be rebutted. For 
instance, Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel economics laureate) writes `Surplus Labor in India: A Critique 
of Schultz's Statistical Test' (in his 1964 book), Schultz defends himself in `Significance of India's 
1918-19 Losses of Agricultural Labor - A Reply', and Sen argues further in `Surplus Labor in India: 
A Rejoinder' - all in Economic Journal (March 1967: 154-65). Another example is that Schultz in 
his 1964 book attacks the `zero marginal product' hypothesis of Arthur Lewis (1954), but the Nobel 
Economics Prize Committee democratically and fairly made these two academic `foes' share the 
1979 Prize albeit neither school has convinced the other (even now).  
But the author is unaware anyone else (besides Zhou 2001) who has criticized the above-
mentioned five assertions of Schultz in literature. Apparently, this was not because other authors 
were lenient to him, but because they were not found as inappropriate. Now that they have already 
been unsuitable in 1964, more so in 1979, further so in 1983, and still so presently, a systematical 
and analytical refutation of them would be necessary, and researches of effective and appropriate 
solutions to the obstacle neglected and misjudged by him imperative. 
 




The irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has also 
caused the failures of the backward linkage effects of the agro- and other industries and the 
                                                 
14 The author’s comments on Hirschman’s linkages theory are not in  Zhou (2001).   27
consumption linkage effects on agriculture, which has been paid little attention by Hirschman and 
others. 
Hirschman (1954, 1958, 1977, 1987) has developed the linkages theory. A linkage (or 
linkage effect) is a characteristic, more or less compelling sequence of investment decisions 
occurring in the course of industrialization and, more generally, of economic development. More 
specifically, the linkage effects of a given product line are investment-generating forces that are set 
in motion, through input-output relations, when productive facilities that supply inputs to that line 
or utilize its outputs are inadequate or nonexistent. Backward linkage leads to new investment in 
input-supplying facilities and forward linkage to investment in output-using facilities, both are 
physical or production linkage. Consumption linkage is the stimulus towards domestic production 
of consumer goods that will be undertaken as newly earned incomes are spent on such goods 
(which are often initially imported). Fiscal linkage includes direct fiscal linkage whereby the state 
extracts (and subsequently spends) revenue through taxes on exports, and indirect fiscal linkage 
whereby it raises (and then disposes of) receipts via tariffs on imports. Inside linkage describes 
situations in which the same economic operators who are already engaged in the ongoing activity 
are impelled to undertake the new activity (either yielding a new product at the same place or 
producing the same product in a new place); while outside linkage depicts circumstances under 
which the new activity is taken up by foreigners or the state. Backward, forward and consumption 
linkages can be either inside or outside linkages, whereas fiscal linkage is outside linkage. 
Hirschman claims that the linkages capture much of the development story: development is 
essentially the record of how one thing leads to another, and the linkages are that record. They focus 
on certain characteristics inherent in the productive activities already in process at a certain time. 
These ongoing activities, because of their characteristics, push or invite some operators to take up 
new activities. Whenever that is the case, a linkage exists between the ongoing and the new activity. 
(Hirschman 1977: 72-3, 80-1; 1987: 206-9). This paper is mainly concerned with the relevant 
problems in the backward linkage effects of the agro- and other industries and consumption linkage 
effects on agriculture. 
Hirschman’s linkages theory has been very influential and widely accepted. For instance, 
FAO stresses that `Industries based on agricultural raw materials played a major part in the early 
stages of the industrialization of developed countries, and they are no less important in the 
industrialization now under way in developing countries. Such industries are estimated to account 
for nearly half of the total manufacturing value added and almost two thirds of the employment in 
the manufacturing sector in the developing countries, and their share in the developed countries, 
although smaller, is still substantial. The development of such industries also has many beneficial 
feedback effects on agricultural production itself’ as there exist `the strategic links and 
interdependencies between agriculture and agro-industries.’ (Santa Cruz 1998: iii). Of these 
feedback effects, `The most direct one is, of course, the stimulus it provides for increased 
agricultural production through market expansion. Often, in fact, the establishment of processing 
facilities is itself an essential first step towards stimulating both consumer demand for the processed 
product and an adequate supply of the raw material. The provision of transport, power and other 
infra-structural facilities required for agro-industries also benefits agricultural production. The 
development of these and other industries provides a more favorable atmosphere for technical 
progress and the acceptance of new ideas in farming itself.’ (FAO 1997). `An effect that is 
sometimes overlooked is the substantial increase in employment in the production of the raw 
material that may result from setting up an industry using it. Even if the industrial process is itself 
capital intensive, considerable employment may be generated in providing the raw material base.’ 
(Marsden & Garzia 1998: 13) 
However, as presented above, Japan has provided an inconsistent case. Now that the agro- 
and other industries have been well developed in that country (features 5-7), why could not their 
backward linkage effects on agriculture be realized (regarding the decline in agricultural production 
and employment of able-bodied labor force in agriculture)? Contrary to the domestic-products-  28
oriented consumption linkage effects which should lead to import substitute as defined by 
Hirschman, there appear reverse or import-oriented consumption linkage effects which have 
substituted domestic products with imports (of agricultural goods in this case). (The reverse or 
import-oriented consumption linkage effects is a concept formulated by the author.) Likewise, the 
EU proposed a complete decoupling between subsidies and production (the major component of the 
agricultural protectionism) on 10 July 2002, but retreated to allow to keep the coupling on 26 June 
2003, just in order ‘to avoid abandonment of production’ (see below). The EU’s high import tariffs 
have also been continuously criticized by the developing countries and international organizations. 
It is well known that the agro- and other industries are well developed in the EU, why could not 
their backward linkage effects on agriculture and domestic-products-oriented consumption linkage 
effects be realized so that the abandonment of agricultural production and increase of unnecessary 
imports would not happen once the agricultural protectionist policies have been lifted? 
Therefore, the following questions arise: can the backward linkage effects of the 
development of the agro- and other industries on agriculture be realized always? Can the more 
favorable  atmosphere for technical progress and the acceptance of new ideas in farming itself 
provided by the industrial development be turned to reality all the time? If not, mainly at which 
stage of rural development? What are the major reasons? How to resolve them? 
In fact, although admitting (1987: 209) that `Some or all of the linkages can fail to 
materialize and an inquiry into these failures permits a preliminary sorting out of major conceivable 
reasons for negative developments’, Hirschman has not endeavored to go beyond the preliminary 
study to systematically research the failures in either one or more linkages, deeply analyze the 
major reasons, and make great efforts to seek solutions. Rather, he mainly takes delight in talking 
about the normal functioning of the linkages. But this would be not only futile in front of the 
failures, but even harmful, as it may lead to the ignorance of them and the illusion as if once (e.g.) 
the agro-industries have been established, their backward linkage effects on agriculture would 
automatically be realized. An analogy could be that, when humankind did not know the circulation 
of blood in the human body, its discovery was significant. Afterwards, further researching the 
normal blood circulation is still necessary, but more importance should be attached to elucidating 
and curing the mal-circulation, since these tasks cannot be fulfilled by merely talking about the 
normal circulation. It would be inappropriate and even detrimental if medical scientists remained at 
mainly speaking on the normal circulation, while paying little attention to so many diseases of mal-
circulation. Just think if doctors cheerfully talked about the normal blood circulation in front of so 
many blood cancer patients who are going to die currently still without solutions. Similarly, despite 
Hirschman (1998: 80, 83, 101) has been an economic adviser to Colombia since 1952 and then 
other parts of Latin America, developed the linkages theory basically out of his studies there, 
happily felt Colombia `was moving forward’ and believed `there is no doubt that Latin America has 
made considerable progress in the 30 years since World War II’, how to explain why the `moving 
forward’ in that country did not lead to more wonderful advancement and the `considerable 
progress’ in that continent did not expand to more successful development through the linkages but 
fell into decline in the 1980s, and how to solve the persisting mal-functioning of the linkages there? 
In fact, it is systematic studies, discovery of main reasons, and solutions of the failures of the 
linkage effects which are desperately longed for by the vast people in deteriorating poverty, 
inequality and injustice there and elsewhere. 
Correspondingly, the above-cited FAO report (1997) has primarily repeated the normal 
backward linkage effects of the agro- and other industries on agriculture raised by Hirschman, as if 
these effects could be taken as granted. By the same illusion, the afore-mentioned FAO document 
(Marsden & Garzia 1998) has only indicated problems in the development of the agro-industries, 
and emphasized its backward linkage effects on agriculture, while essentially ignored the failures in 
the realization of them. It is interesting that the recommended methodology `was field-tested during 
an FAO project in Thailand’ (Santa Cruz 1998: iii), but the above-mentioned `Symposium Theme’ 
of the International Symposium (2002) in Thailand has reported a worsening agricultural situation   29
exactly in Thailand and Southeast Asia. It is thus imperative to systematically study the failures in 
the realization of the backward linkage effects of the agro- and other industries and the consumption 
linkage effects on agriculture, their main reasons, and the effective and appropriate solutions. 
As analyzed in the author’s book (Zhou 2001) and earlier parts of this paper, it is the 
irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent farmers (typically small 
but not excluding large landowners such as in Latin America where land reform has not been 
completed) which has restricted the functioning of the market mechanism, and restrained the full-
time farmers from achieving economies of scale or just becoming viable. Thus, fundamentally it is 
this obstacle which has hampered the realization of the backward linkage effects on agriculture of 
the agro- and other industries, and caused the reverse consumption linkage effects, as the demand 
for agricultural products these linkages have induced could not be matched domestically (if without 
government trade-distorting protectionism) and imports have to be resorted to. Although this 
obstacle appeared first in Japan in 1960, it has increasingly become global under both public and 
private land ownership, with both traditional and modern agriculture, upon both fragmented small 
and consolidatorily enlarged land, in both low and high income economies, at both stages of food 
under-self-sufficiency and overproduction, and within both developing and developed countries.
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III. China’s Successful Experiences Based on Public Land Ownership 
 
Unlike the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, other nations (as large as China, India, 
Brazil, and the EU, and as small as Japan, South Korea, and many other countries across Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, and Europe) do worry about losing basic self-sufficiency in cereals.  
This is not merely an economic issue, as political, social and cultural factors enter. 
Economically speaking, one may suggest those countries with food shortage caused by the 
irrational and polyopolistic land use of able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers to import 
from others, until this has led to a global food shortage to raise the prices of agricultural products 
and induce the part-time and absent farmers to make efficient land use to produce more. However, 
before this pure and idealistic Ricardian model of free market mechanism could function, those 
countries in food shortage would have to lose basic self-sufficiency in cereals and chiefly rely on 
imports. But politically speaking, if a country relied on imports for its cereals, then it might be 
threatened in diplomatic conflicts and have its throat cut during wartime. Thus, basic self-
sufficiency in cereals (such as rice for Asia and wheat for Europe) is a strategic issue. That is why 
Japan could tolerate under-self-sufficiency and rely on imports for all the other agricultural goods 
but not rice (as well as whale of course), which has consequently been heavily subsidized ever since 
1960 for reaching artificial self-sufficiency (and even overproduction) and whose import since 1994 
was mainly due to the international pressure. Not to mention those poor African, Latin American and 
Asian countries and CEECs still at the food under-self-sufficiency stage which could neither afford to 
import with their scarce foreign exchanges nor rely on international donations to feed their 
populations. Socially and culturally speaking, one may easily propose the EU to only keep the 
landscape for tourism and import everything else, e.g., cheaper agricultural and industrial goods from 
Australia, the USA and many developing countries. But the EU would not agree as abandoning 
agriculture especially cereal production which has been carried out for hundreds of years would be 
socially and culturally unacceptable.  
The UK before losing world-wide colonies had not sought basic self-sufficiency in cereals in 
Britain and Northern Ireland. This has often been cited as an example to advocate that basic self-
sufficiency in cereals is not necessary for a country. (Beaumond 2004. Brooks 2004). But such 
advocators have forgotten that when it had world-wide colonies, the colonies and the occupying 
country constituted a large sovereign nation, so that it could rely on them for basic self-sufficiency 
in cereals. This is just an example that basic self-sufficiency in cereals is necessary for a country. 
                                                 
15  The author emailed his Cambridge Conference paper (Zhou 2003) including this section to Hirschman for his 
comments on 12 March 2004 but has never received his reply.   30
Similarly, the EU as a super nation intends to keep basic self-sufficiency in cereals at the EU level, 
but not for each Member State, so that some Member States may overproduce to feed the others. In 
fact, some Member States (e.g., Italy, Portugal) do bear under-self-sufficiency in cereals. 
One may think that basic self-sufficiency in cereals is not necessary for any country since 
today’s world is completely different from before as there is no perspective of war; it might be 
necessary for developing countries because they do not have enough foreign exchanges to import 
foods but not so for developed nations. Such a view has not taken into account that sanctions, 
embargos, invasions, wars and threats have not disappeared, so that today’s world is not yet 
completely different from before. Thus, many countries have been forced to maintain food 
sovereignty and advocate for a basic or ever complete self-sufficiency for more products than 
cereals in the WTO negotiations (Brooks 2004). The free trade zone to be established in 2010 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China as decided in November 2001 will 
reduce the tariff on rice in 2015 only by 50%, rather than 100%, reflecting the strategic desire of the 
member states to keep a certain degree of self-sufficiency in rice, is an example. The author visited 
the WTO in 13-14 September 2004 and asked which country is willing to lose basic self-sufficiency 
in cereals, but no country could be indicated. 
But even if in a peaceful world without perspective of war and threat and without frontiers 
and tariffs among nations, could the Ricardian model of free market mechanism function 
automatically, so that the global food shortage would raise the prices of agricultural products and 
induce the part-time and absent farmers to make efficient land use to produce more? As is well known, 
before the land reform, a few landlords owned large areas of land, while most peasants owned none 
or little and had to be either tenants paying exorbitant rents or laborers receiving extremely low 
wages. Although the prices of the agricultural products were much higher than what the poor people 
could afford, the Ricardian model of free market mechanism could not induce the landlords to 
produce more and reduce prices so that poor people could afford other than remaining in hunger or 
going to die. This was essentially because they were oligopolists or even monopolists (in some 
regions) in land ownership, and wished to keep prices and profits high rather than responding to the 
social interests including the need of the poor. The above-mentioned Brazilian case where large 
landowners refuse to reduce prices of the already overproduced foods so as to let people in hunger 
to afford, and decline to lease land out at low rents in order to make poor full-time or landless 
farmers rent in their land, is an existing example. Hence the land reform which has been obliged by 
the state to distribute the land of the large owners to peasants with no or little land. But afterwards, 
many able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers have not used land efficiently even at the 
under-self-sufficiency stage. Why did not the high prices at food shortage period induce them to at 
least lease the land beyond the family consumption need to the remaining full-time and still existent 
or appearing landless farmers? This is mainly because they are polyopolists in land ownership, and 
only respond to high rents rather than the social interests containing the need of the full-time and 
landless farmers who cannot afford to pay them. That is why at the under-self-sufficiency stage, 
laws of obliging them to lease insufficiently produced land to full-time farmers have been 
implemented in Germany, the UK, Denmark, the EU, Italy and still in Norway although there was 
no internal war within each of these countries. Therefore, high prices caused by food shortage even 
without war or tariff among nations could not make the Ricardian model of free market mechanism 
function automatically, and in order to realize rational and competitive land use, effective and 
appropriate state obligation would still and always be necessary. 
As above-cited, the author’s book (Zhou 2001) presents that China has found effective and 
appropriate solutions to this microeconomic root, and accordingly maintained basic self-sufficiency 
in cereals, prevented overproduction, improved the environment, without resorting to protectionism. 
As the first stage, during 1978-83, China carried out a land tenure reform from the centrally 
planned economy to market economy by keeping public land ownership of villages, while 
contracting the land to households as the basic operation level whereas the villages provided 
general management and services, hence successfully reached basic food self-sufficiency in 1984.   31
Although the contracted land could be sub-let, irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied 
part-time and absent small farmers also happened at the beginning of the 1980s and became serious 
afterwards. Thus in an evolutionary approach, as the second stage, around the mid-1980s, a second 
round of institutional changes has been conducted. Under the guidance of the government, the 
villages, upon the majority agreement of the villagers, obligatorily kept a smaller land for family 
consumption for the part-time and absent small farmers, while allocating the rest of their land 
competitively to the full-time farmers (Dual Land System). The government also encouraged (but 
not forced) part-time and absent small farmers to be fully engaged in off-farm activities or become 
permanent residents of small and medium cities and towns, and voluntarily transfer all their land to 
the fewer remaining full-time farmers to achieve economies of scale (Single Land System). Thus 
China maintained basic self-sufficiency in cereals rather than losing it as Japan did (followed by 
Taiwan Province of China and South Korea). As the third stage, during 1995-99, it encountered 
temporary food overproduction. The government has then obliged farmers on the environmentally 
sensitive land to convert it back to the nature (forestry, grassland, lake land and wetland) forever, 
and paid them a basic income support until they could earn a living through production of fruits, 
vegetables, livestock, fishery, planned cutting of woods with reforestation, agro-industry for 
processing agricultural products, transportation, rural tourism, and other off-farm activities. It has 
meanwhile kept the rational and competitive use of the normal land to produce surplus food, which 
is allocated to the farmers of the environmentally sensitive land converted to the nature. Therefore, 
nation-wide, the food supply and demand have been balanced and chronic overproduction 
prevented, whilst the environment improved. By overcoming the irrational and polyopolistic land 
use of able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers as the fundamental microeconomic obstacle, 
China has given subsidies to agriculture by only 2% of the total value of production, much less than 
10% for a developing country and 8.5% for China (Song & Yao 2005). At all the three stages, there 
has been a close macro-micro linkage in gradual, evolutionary and dynamic experimenting, policy-
making, popularizing, and stability-maintaining. (For details see Zhou 2001: Chapters 6-7.). Of 
course, there is still room for China to improve, which will be dealt with later. Public land 
ownership, however, may not be acceptable to many other economies.
16 Then how to solve this 
microeconomic root under private land ownership?  
 
IV. Unsuitable Solutions under Private Land Ownership 
 
(I) A General Survey 
1. Those solutions which had functioned from the Middle Ages to the 1950s in Western 
Europe (land enclosure, primogeniture, massive emigration, land sale due to the then backward 
conditions of rural areas) would not work now (see Zhou 2001: 146-50). 
2. Traditional land consolidation currently being carried out in some CEECs, NIS and other 
developing countries incurs enormous individual bargains, and costs tremendous time (even 
decades), financial and human resources. Although the joined parcels would convenience 
cultivation and smoothen leasing, due to the low elasticity in consumption of cereals and many 
other products, the raise of tenants’ income might not necessarily be so high as to induce the part-
time and absent small landowners to lease land out, as the experiences of Japan and Taiwan 
Province of China have demonstrated. As analyzed below, those EU countries which had already 
carried out successful land consolidation long time ago (such as Denmark) are also facing 
production abandonment following the reduction of protectionism. Moreover, population growth 
and inheritance could easily re-fragment the joined family farm, as the Indian practice has shown. 
(For a comparative international survey of land consolidation under private farmland ownership and 
its shortcomings, see Zhou 2001: Appendix 3.1). Thus it is helpful but not a fundamental solution. 
                                                 
16  The author attended the above-mentioned International Symposium (2002) in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where 
participants also expressed that though the Chinese reform experiences are successful, it would be difficult to transplant 
them into other countries, because China holds public land ownership, while most other countries have private one.   32
3. How about imposing a land waste tax which seems more market oriented? In fact, such a tax has 
been repeatedly proposed, e.g., as early as in (1956: 563) by Schiller (and may even be earlier by 
others), and as recently as in (2002) by Onchan for Thailand where the irrational and polyopolistic 
land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has become very serious. The Romanian 
Law on Land Resources of 20 February 1991stipulates ‘Article 53. All owners of agricultural land 
must assure its cultivation and its soil protection’; ‘Article 54. Land owners who do not fulfill the 
obligations stipulated in article 53, will be summoned in writing to comply, by the commune, city, 
or municipality. Those who do not obey the summons and who through their own fault, do not 
fulfill their obligations within the time established by the town hall, will be given an annual fine of 
5,000 to 100,000 lei per ha, depending on the land's category of use. The fine is ordered by 
reasoned decision of the town hall, and the money becomes an income to the local budget’; ‘Article 
55. . . . They lose right to the use of the land after a period of two years’. Such a fine is also a land 
waste tax. 
However, a land waste tax is unable to function effectively. (1) If the tax were low, some 
farmers would be willing to pay, while still idling the land. For example, in China, the village 
collectively owned land was contracted to households which should produce a quota of cereals 
and/or other products to be sold to the state and could then dispose of the extra output in the market. 
But there were landholders who paid cash to fulfill the quota while still idling the land, so as to 
spare all their time onto earning higher off-farm income (Zhou 2001: 215). (2) If the tax were high, 
some farmers could claim that they could not afford. It would not be so easy to punish them by 
imprisonment. In fact, such a law may not be passed as the parliamentary members dare not offend 
the part-time and absent landowners. (3) Many farmers are absent, earning higher income in other 
rural areas, cities or abroad. It would almost be impossible for the police to wait in their home 
unknowing when they would return, or search and arrest them elsewhere either directly or indirectly 
via the International Criminal Police Organization or other countries’ police. There is also the 
question whether other countries’ police would cooperate. For instance, many Albanian, Tunisian 
and Moroccan landowners are illegally working in Italy while idling land at home. But tax evasion 
in Italy itself is widespread and the police often close one eye. While the police are having troubles 
in finding and arresting the tax evading absent farmers, the land is still being idled. (4) The tax is 
normally paid to the governments, although a part might be channeled to local communities to 
improve services to full-time farmers. But if the full-time farmers could not get the fundamental 
service they need, i.e., access to the irrationally and polyopolistically used land of the able-bodied 
part-time and absent small farmers, other services would be insignificant. Thus they may not have 
the incentive to report an insufficiently cultivated or idled land to the tax officers. The tax officers 
may not have the incentive to charge the tax because it does not enter their own pocket. Rather they 
might have the incentive to take bribes and allow tax evasion. But if a proportion of tax could be 
given to tax officers as bonus, they might charge it arbitrarily and exorbitantly. As a result of such 
difficulties, in Romania, although land leasing is widespread, idling of normal land still exists 
according to Balint (2004).  
4. A law to confiscate idled private land has been adopted in a presidential decree issued in 
November 1997 in Tajikistan (EIU 1998: 27); and has been debated in the Romanian Parliament in 
the spring of 2002, but has met difficulty in getting it passed mainly because it was regarded as too 
harsh to private landowners (Atanasiu 2002). 
5. If GMO (Genetically Modified Organism) cereals were produced, could a nation achieve 
basic self-sufficiency while tolerating production abandonment by part-time and absent farmers? (1) 
Most consumers of the world would not accept GMO foods. (2) Even if so, economies of scale 
would still exist so that full-time large farmers would prevail by lower costs in producing GMO 
cereals, while those nations suffering from production abandonment by part-time and absent 
farmers would lose basic self-sufficiency in cereals in the competition due to their higher costs. 
6. If a Land Bank (such the South Korean government was trying to establish in 2004) could 
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farmers to the full-time farmers? A Land Bank only provides information concerning where and 
which land is idled or insufficiently produced, but cannot effect its transfer to the efficient and 
rational users. In fact, in many villages, there is no information asymmetry or shortage, as the full-
time farmers can see the idled or insufficiently produced land of their part-time and absent farming 
neighbors, but cannot have access to it due to the refusal of the owners to lease it out at low rents. 
Thus the author tries to find a new model which would work at both food under-self-
sufficiency and overproduction stages for both developing and developed countries with private 
land ownership, and raises ‘the principles of the new model’ (without the element of physically 
unwithdrawable but financially salable private land shares) at (Zhou 2001: 165-6), and several 
possible applications of them. 
  One application is Proposal 5.1: village-wide corporate ownership of physically 
unwithdrawable but financially salable private land shares, which was published by FAO in October 
1997 first (Zhou 2001: 154-65). It is then found that this would meet psychological barriers as 
landowners prefer that their private land could be withdrawn from the use by others.  
Another application is raised when dealing with the EU (Zhou 2001: 398 second paragraph), which 
does not require such unwithdrawability. It is this one, although only occupying less than half a 
page in the book, that this paper develops into a set of major policy proposals. The following 
sections will first analyze two Western European laws which have functioned effectively at the 
under-self-sufficiency stage, the dilemmas the EU faces at the overproduction stage as the 
background, and then present the author’s policy proposals and its possible global relevance.  
 
(II) Two Western European Legislations at the Food Under-Self-Sufficiency Stage 
1. A legislation to oblige farmers to either cultivate land or lease it for farming has been 
implemented once in Germany, the UK, Denmark and still in Norway. 
In Germany, `Previous scarcities of foodstuffs prompted the legislation to adopt provisions to help 
guarantee an adequate food supply by obliging farmers to cultivate agricultural land in accordance 
with good husbandry. If a farmer did not satisfy this legal obligation, the law provided sanctions, 
such as the compulsory leasing of the land to another person willing to cultivate the land in 
accordance with good husbandry.’ This obligation was set up in the `Law of Cultivating the Land’ 
of 31 March 1915 and removed in 1961 owing to the appearance of surplus production. (Winkler 
1992: 83. Kroescbell 1982: 69) 
In the UK, the Agriculture Act of 6 August 1947 demands that the owner of agricultural land 
bear the responsibilities of good estate management to enable an occupier of the land `to maintain 
efficient production as respects both the kind of produce and the quality and quantity thereof’ 
(section 10); and that the occupier of agricultural land bear the responsibilities of good husbandry to 
maintain `a reasonable standard of efficient production, as respects both the kind of produce and the 
quality and quantity thereof, while keeping the unit in a condition to enable such a standard to be 
maintained in the future’ (section 11). The minimum lease period is one year (section 40). It renders 
the Minister of Agriculture the power to supervise whether these responsibilities have been fulfilled 
(section 12), and if not, to impose a fine and/or imprisonment on the bearers of these 
responsibilities (section 14), and to purchase compulsorily the land (section 16). Following the 
occurrence of surplus production and EC Council Regulation 1094 of 1988 on set-aside arable land, 
the implementation of this Act has also been relaxed (Rodgers 1992: 149). 
In Denmark, the Agricultural Holdings Act of 17 July 1989 sets down that `Agricultural 
holdings and their lands must be used for agriculture, horticulture, and forestry.’ `Subdivision of 
agricultural holdings may not be carried out without a license from the land authorities. This 
ensures that the holdings are not split up into small enterprises, for example in case of succession.’ 
‘As a general rule, only individuals may acquire agricultural holdings in the rural zones. Persons 
who acquire an agricultural holding in these zones must live on the farm permanently for eight 
years whether they actually manage the farm or not. If the area of the holding exceeds 30 ha, they 
must also have a training in agriculture and they must not farm out any part of the land’. `The   34
person who actually manages an agricultural holding, whether it is the owner him- or herself, a 
tenant, or a manager, must live permanently on the holding’. `Landowners who wish to use their 
land for a purpose other than farming must obtain a permit from the many authorities that deal with 
the legislation mentioned above’ (the Queen, Parliament, Ministry for the Environment, Ministry of 
Agriculture, local government - county and municipal councils, and courts). ‘Each authority is free 
to refuse a permit if it feels that the landowner’s project would be harmful to the interests the 
legislation tries to protect.’ `If the yield of the land is too feeble to make farming worthwhile, the 
farmer must at least not use the land for other purposes’ (of course he could lease such land out). 
Concerning leasing, `The statute only requires a written contract specifying the rent and the term of 
the lease. It does not regulate the rent, which is solely determined by the market price.’ As a result 
of such promotive measures, the problem that `the technical and economic development in 
agriculture in the last decades have made most registered holdings too small for survival’ has been 
overcome, the farms’ `number has fallen and their size has increased’, and `most Danish farms 
today consist of a holding owned by a farmer who has rented adjoining land’. Adjusting to the 
happening of food overproduction, it `does not compel a farmer to cultivate marginal farmland, and 
he may also profit from the set-aside scheme of the EC Regulation 1094 of 1988’. (Wulff 1992: 36, 
38-9, 40, 44, 46-7). The Agricultural Holdings Act of 15 July 1999 further permits owners to idle or 
set aside normal land. Although landowners are not obliged to set aside land according to the 
government planning, possibilities of expropriation exist within the specific Danish rules on nature 
conservation, nature restoration and wetland restoration (the Nature Protection Act of 3 January 
1992) which are not related to the EC agricultural law. (Anker 4 March & 13 May 2002) 
In Norway (which has not joined the EU), the Land Act of 18 March 1955, the Act of 
Tenancy of 25 June 1965, and the Concession Act of 31 May 1974 lay down that a farmland must 
be either self-cultivated, or leased for farming even if the rent is not so high as to satisfy the 
landowner (of course, the owner can choose the highest rent bidder, thus a leasing market still 
exists; but the rent can be fixed by the Municipal Agricultural Board if there is disagreement); 
unreasonably high rent is unlawful; the minimum lease term is five-year; a reasonable yield must be 
produced; the landowner must live in the farm even though the land is leased out (so as to keep 
rural population); otherwise the land will be compulsorily sold; sufficient farmland is secured for 
active farmers, and it is possible to keep the price of farmland lower than the market price. 
Although these regulations have been criticized as `communist’, Norwegians do not want to change 
them. For Norway, `with a hard climate and marginal conditions for agriculture, development could 
lead to an increased movement of people from the districts to the centers and the end of agrarian 
activities in many districts’. `The legislation securing arable land for agricultural purposes has, as a 
whole, been successful. Use of arable land for densely built-up areas, roads, and other purposes has 
decreased. The aim of being self-sufficient in food has been achieved for husbandry products, most 
vegetables, feed grains, and half the grain used for human consumption’. (Austena 1992: 140-3, 
146-7). The legislation is still applied as basic self-sufficiency in cereals has not been achieved. 
2. A law to give farmers right to till any insufficiently cultivated land in the EU and Italy. 
At the EU level, `A number of directives affect the ownership of farmland as a farmer’. The EC 
Council `Directive 1963/262 provides for the right to pursue agricultural activities on agricultural 
holdings that have been abandoned or left uncultivated for at least two years. No special permit is 
required’. `Directive 1967/531 provides for the abolition of discriminatory restrictions on the 
application of the law on agricultural leases. Directive 1963/261 concerns the right to take on lease 
any property’. Following overproduction, these directives terminated (officially on 30 July 1999 but 
actually in the 1980s), and the EC Council Regulation 1094 of 1988 and Regulation 2328 of 1991 
decided to pay farmers to set aside a part of arable land from cereals production, on the condition 
that the `Member States have to take the necessary measures to keep the land in good agricultural 
condition. They can make the necessary provisions for managing the land so that the environment 
and natural resources are protected [article 2(3)].’ (Van der Velde & Snyder 1992: 9, 13-4)   35
In Italy, the `Rules for the Utilization of the Uncultivated, Abandoned or Insufficiently 
Cultivated Lands’ of 4 August 1978 requires (Art. 4) that the Regions assign such lands `for 
cultivation to the requesters who are obliged to cultivate them in a single or associated form’. 
Regulation of the Tuscan Region ‘Norms to Realize the Law of 4 August 1978 No. 440 for the 
Productive Recovery of the Uncultivated, Abandoned or Insufficiently Cultivated Lands’ of 3 
November 1979 (Art. 3) further stipulates that ‘The town governments, should execute census and 
classification of the uncultivated or abandoned lands; and besides, provide its renewed annual 
relative lists’. ‘The censused land lists determined by the town government should be published for 
30 days in the government bulletin’. (Art. 4) ‘The entities who intend to cultivate such lands should 
attach a declaration of commitment to cultivation and a general plan of recovering and utilizing 
such lands to their demand for assigning such lands’ for the Provincial Commission to approve and 
assign the lands. After the EU met overproduction, these laws have not been implemented, but still 
valid; and could be exercised again if food security once more became a problem. 
 
(III) The Fundamental and Derived Dilemmas the EU Faces at the Overproduction Stage 
At the overproduction stage, these legislations ceased functioning because the EU has faced a 
fundamental dilemma and some derived dilemmas still without being solved.  
The fundamental dilemma is: still obliging farmers to either cultivate land or lease it out for 
farming would strengthen overproduction; but if not, much land would be irrationally and 
polyopolistically used by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers, while full-time farmers 
could not easily achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, become viable and more competitive in 
front of the USA, Canada and Australia with much larger farm size and much lower general 
production costs and many developing countries with much lower labor costs.
17 Without a solution, 
farmers (mainly full-time ones) pressed the governments for a high standard living equivalent to 
that of the part-time and absent farmers against the difficulties caused by the lower prices following 
the overproduction. The governments had to yield fearing losing not only their votes but also basic 
self-sufficiency in cereals if full-time farmers were also forced to become part-time and absent. 
Thus the EU implemented protectionism of a coupling between subsidies and production; price 
supports to keep agricultural goods at prices over the international levels; export aids for farmers to 
dump products at prices lower than costs to developing countries, and high tariffs against cheaper 
imports. As the coupling is the most important of them, the following analysis will focus on it. 
1. The coupling could not solve that fundamental dilemma but has led to derived dilemmas. 
Concerning overproduction. Under the coupling, if farmers have produced surplus, the EU has to 
buy it, which has encouraged overproduction and concealed the irrational and polyopolistic land use 
by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers in the large farm sector mainly in the plain areas 
where land is generally consolidated, because the protectionism could guarantee the income of the 
tenants to be able to pay high rents to the landowners to lease land out (here the large farm 
obviously means a farm under operation, not necessarily under ownership, as the operator may lease 
in small parcels to form a large farm). Thus on one hand, the EU intends to avoid the surplus, and 
has put quotas on some products (e.g., milk, sugar); and set aside a part of arable land from 
production of cereals (and other arable crops, i.e., food-used oilseeds and protein plants), including 
highly productive land (producing over 92 tons/20 ha in cereals, representing on average 72% of the 
arable crops area, and at a rate set each year by the EU, in the 2000/01-2006/07 marketing years 
10%) under a (quasi-)compulsory program (Council Regulation 1251 of 1999: Article 6; European 
Commission 2002: 1) (quasi means farmers are not obliged to set aside land, but induced to do so if 
they wish to receive set-aside subsides), and less productive land on a voluntary basis (European 
Commission 2002: 3). On the other, overproduction has not been avoided since the coupling as the 
engine is still yielding it. Derived dilemma 1. 
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Regarding competitiveness. Under the coupling, farmers’ competitiveness through lowering 
costs seems not so important, because if they could not sell products, the EU would buy them. Thus 
on one side, the EU has the incentive to make the land use more efficient via economies of scale to 
reduce the enduring high costs, and has exercised an early retirement scheme in both the EU and 
CEE accession countries through SAPARD (2000) to pay old farmers to transfer land to young 
farmers (lease, sale, or entitlement change without sale). But it would in turn contribute to 
overproduction. Thus on the other, irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time 
and absent small farmers seriously exists in the small farm sector of the southern states (Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain) and accession countries where land is more fragmented because the rents of 
the fragmented small parcels are usually lower than those of the consolidated land. Of course, it 
also appears in other countries like Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, etc. Derived dilemma 2. 
In respect of the budget. The coupling has led to overproduction and unanticipatable budget 
as the overproduction may exceed the expectation, and cost the taxpayers and consumers huge 
amount of money. The EU wished to reduce the heavy budget deficits and has introduced in the set-
aside and early retirement schemes, which however, have added financial burdens too, meanwhile 
have resolved neither overproduction nor irrational and polyopolistic land use. Derived dilemma 3. 
In the field of the international cooperation, the EU aims to help developing countries and 
has set up many programs with economic and technological assistance. But the high trade-distorting 
coupling, price supports, export aids and import restrictions have unfairly harmed the interests of 
the Third World. Thus, the EU has been continuously criticized in this aspect. Derived dilemma 4. 
2. The decoupling could not bypass that fundamental dilemma. 
Realizing some of the shortcomings of the coupling, the EU conducted incremental partial 
decoupling between subsidies and production during 1992-99, and released the `Mid-Term Review 
of CAP of Agenda 2000’ (MTR 10 July 2002) as a watershed document in the CAP reform. Its 
major importance was that the EU had finally proposed to completely decouple the link between 
direct payments and production, so that farmers would fully compete in the market, rather than 
gearing production to subsidies. It would be implemented by the accession countries, thus reducing 
the financial burdens of the enlargement. It stipulated ‘the maximum sum paid to a farm will be 
EUR 300,000’ annually (MTR 2002: 23) so as to abate the previous situation that most subsidies 
went to the fewer large farms. It would also improve market opportunities for the developing 
countries, and constitute a good example for the other developed nations (in particular the USA, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea) to follow. 
The MTR was significant also in that the decoupled direct payments to each farm would be 
conditional upon cross-compliance with the environmental, food safety, and animal welfare 
standards. This would bring about chiefly positive results in these fields but could not bypass the 
above-mentioned fundamental and derived dilemmas. 
At the demand side, the decoupling has increased the need for more efficient land use. As 
mentioned above, under the coupling, competitiveness of farmers seems not so important, because 
if farmers could not sell products, the EU would buy them. After the decoupling, however, the EU 
would cease doing so. Therefore farmers would have to fully compete in the market for selling their 
products. Higher quality and localized special trade marks could promote their sales. But with the 
same or similar quality, in the sea of numerous localized special trade marks (each of which would 
claim that it is the best), and for many cereals which could not be easily specialized locally, lower 
costs would be more competitive. This would in turn necessitate the increase of farm size so as to 
achieve economies of scale and reduce costs by the full-time farmers. 
At the supply side, some MTR measures may strengthen the irrational and polyopolistic land 
use. First, after the decoupling, farmers would have to sell their products in the market because the 
EU would no longer purchase their surplus, and market prices would be lowered due to more 
competition. This would lead to a positive result that farmers would no more have the incentive to 
produce more than what they could sell, but also a negative consequence, i.e., ‘in some cases 
abandonment of land’, as MTR (2002: 19) anticipated, rather than leasing it to the full-time farmers   37
who would require it for achieving economies of scale. Second, after the decoupling, a direct 
payment would be given to each ha which has been granted a payment in 2000-02 under one of the 
support schemes (e.g., in the UK 200-250 pounds per year), even if it does not produce any product, 
as long as the farmer has fulfilled the cross-compliance with the environmental standards (it would 
not be difficult to plant trees and grasses to prevent soil erosion), while the cross-compliance with 
the food safety and animal welfare standards would be irrelevant if the farm neither produces any 
crop nor raises any animal. This would give the incentive to some and even many farmers to just 
enjoy a direct payment without production, and spend all their time on earning off-farm income, 
without leasing the land to the full-time farmers, so as to avoid the decoupled payments from going 
to the tenant (according to the MTR, the decoupled direct payments should be given to the operator 
who could be either landowner or tenant). It was under the belief to let farmers decide whether to 
produce or not, that the farm ministers of the EU Member States proposed in the MTR that the 
decoupled payments be given to farmers even if they produce zero (Lohe 2004). But they have 
overlooked that even though some farmers do not wish to produce, other farmers do wish to but 
could not gain access to the irrationally and polyopolistically used land of the part-time and absent 
landowners. Thus exactly according to the same belief, there should be an effective and appropriate 
solution to realize the ‘efficient allocation of land in farming’ to those who can ‘produce the same 
output with fewer resources or a larger output from the same resources’ from those who cannot, 
which unfortunately the MTR did not provide. 
  Therefore, the decoupling could not bypass the above-revealed fundamental dilemma. 
Rather, it would only expose it which has been largely concealed by the protectionism. Although 
the MTR anticipated the risk of land abandonment after the decoupling, it has provided no solution 
to deal with it. Thus if this fundamental dilemma could not be overcome, then the decoupling might 
fail, as the full-time farmers would again exert pressure on the political parties to either resume 
coupling or continue other forms of protectionism so as to guarantee them a high standard living. 
This was the author’s prediction in his Cambridge Conference paper (Zhou 2003: 26-7) 
submitted on 13 June 2003. Unfortunately, supportive evidence appeared so quickly: on 26 June 
2003, after about one year’s debates on MTR, what the EU farm ministers adopted (European 
Commission 2003) was a retreat from MTR’s ‘completely decoupling the link between direct 
payments and production’ to a bulk decoupling and limited coupling: ‘the vast majority of subsidies 
will be paid independently from the volume of production’, while ‘Member States may choose to 
maintain a limited link between subsidy and production under well defined conditions and within 
clear limits’, just in order ‘to avoid abandonment of production’. Although called ‘a fundamental 
reform of the CAP’, it was downgraded to be merely a continuation in the same category of the 
incremental partial decoupling during 1992-99 for those countries still keeping the coupling. This 
has clearly demonstrated that after the complete decoupling, some farmers would irrationally 
abandon production, rather than leasing their irrationally and polyopolistically used land to the full-
time farmers who would need it to achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, and become viable or 
more competitive. In 2004, a few Member States have chosen to keep the coupling (e.g., France on 
cereals, Austria on beef), while others a complete decoupling, and further others to decide in 2005-
06. But even if a complete decoupling could be made, there are still price supports, export aids, and 
import restrictions of the protectionism to guarantee the income of the tenants. Once all of them 
have been further reduced and abolished, and the high decoupled payments
18 have  also  been 
decreased to the WTO standards as the EU plans to after 2013 (Ahner 2004), the refusal of leasing 
land out at low rents and production abandonment by landowners would happen. Thus, the 
irrational and polyopolistic land use by able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has become 
the most fundamental root of the agricultural protectionism. Unfortunately, this root has largely 
been neglected in both the academic and policy-making fields.  
                                                 
18 According to Choplin (2004), the EU’s budget on the decoupled payments is higher than that on the coupled ones.   38
Concerning reducing overproduction, the MTR proposed to continue the (quasi-) 
compulsory set-aside on highly productive land (i.e., farmers should set aside such land if they want 
to get the decoupled direct payments), while lowly productive land could receive the decoupled 
direct payments no matter whether it is set-aside or not (i.e., not compulsorily). This was adopted 
by the EU Presidency Compromise (30 June 2003: 6, 12, 27) (in agreement with the Commission). 
Although the new set-aside is called environmental set-aside, it is still aimed at reducing 
overproduction. Here the EU has again neglected that its overproduction is not caused by the 
availability for farming of too much highly productive land, but by protectionism (without which 
farmers would have no incentive to overproduce even if much highly productive land is available) 
which is in turn caused by the irrational and polyopolistic land use of the able-bodied part-time and 
absent (mainly small) farmers. The EU farm ministers’ decision of 26 June 2003 and EU 
Presidency Compromise of 30 June 2003 have been legalized into Council Regulation (EC) No 
1782/2003 (29 September 2003). 
  However, continuing protectionism is not a solution acceptable to the developing countries, 
international organizations, and the EU itself. Thus in 2000, the EU had adopted the Lisbon 
Strategy which advocates more competition. Seeing the unsatisfactory result of its implementation, 
at the beginning of 2005, the EU has revised it and requested the Member States to set up national 
programs of execution. Before taking the EU Presidency during the latter half of 2005, in the 
second half of June, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that it would be too late to discuss in 
2014 the reduction of the CAP expenditure which accounts for 40% of the EU budget while only 
about 5% of the EU citizens are working on agriculture; asked to decrease EU’s protectionist farm 
subsidies (of which France has been the largest recipient) which have made the agriculture of not 
only France but also the EU uncompetitive, so that the EU could turn the funds to developing more 
competitive industry, services, education, science and technology in which it is behind the USA and 
has suffered brain drain to the USA; and otherwise, the UK would continue to demand the EU to 
return over 4 billion Euro from its contributions annually which was gained in 1984 by the then 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as a balance against the reception of the large quantity of farm 
subsidies by France. Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, etc. also wish to reduce their 
financial contributions. However, the French President Jacques Chirac did not agree, because if so, 
many farmers would not produce. (Tian 2005. Guang Ming Net-Daily 2005. CPE 2005). Thus, the 
EU is at a crossroad: either continue protectionism (causing overproduction), or face production 
abandonment (losing basic self-sufficiency in cereals). 
  3. These legislations could not both promote large farmers and retain small farmers in 
agriculture, which is also an unresolved dilemma persisting in developed and developing countries  
During the incremental partial decoupling of 1992-99, the EU had gradually replaced price 
subsidies by direct income subsidies, reduced intervention schemes, and successively decreased 
administrative prices towards the international levels, aiming to achieve a `farming without 
subsidies’ and let the market decide prices in the long-run. As a result, `not all EU agricultural 
production is sheltered by high tariffs and the EU prices may be close to international levels for a 
significant share of EU production, depending on market price fluctuations’ in the view of 
Beaumond (2002) (although the view of many developing countries may not completely be the 
same). Such market-oriented measures have been relatively favorable to the large farmers, because 
they have lower costs due to economies of scale and are stronger in the market competition; but 
unfavorable to the already weak small farmers, and have led to more exiting by them from agriculture, 
and consequently encountered protests from farmers out of their gained interests. Thus the EU 
wishes to both strengthen large farmers and retain small farmers in agriculture, because on one hand, 
urban unemployment has already been so high and homeless people so many, and on the other, rural 
development should be promoted to avoid the increase of `ghost towns’ with nearly empty population. 
(Zhou 2001: 398). But how to combine these two seemingly contradictory aims? Apparently, the 
above-mentioned Western European legislations could not provide a solution. 
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(IV) The Unsuitability of the Legislations at the Under-Self-Sufficiency Stage 
Now that the above-cited two Western European legislations have been successful for overcoming 
food under-self-sufficiency, why could not they be popularized to many other countries still at that 
stage? One of the reasons is that they oblige landowners to lease out all their inefficiently used land 
or give right to other farmers to till all of it (which might be imperative in the war era, but not so in 
the peace epoch), so that part-time and absent landowners would be unable to produce for their 
family consumption and keep farming skills; and once lost off-farm jobs, would have no access to 
their land rented out, or have to withdraw it within the contractual period (as many developing 
countries cannot afford to provide them with a basic social welfare), hence affecting the lessees.  
 
V. A Proposed Effective and Appropriate Solution for Private Land Ownership 
 
The author thus proposes, in an evolutionary approach, a legislation for both developed and 
developing countries at both under-self-sufficiency and overproduction stages, without changing 
private land ownership, to achieve the following aims at the same time: minimize/abolish/prevent 
protectionism, while avoiding irrational production abandonment and overproduction; reinforce 
full-time large farmers, whereas not crowding part-time and absent small farmers out of agriculture; 
reach/maintain basic national self-sufficiency in cereals, meanwhile promoting multi-functionality 
of other agricultural and rural sectors and improving the environment. (1) Creation of a Dual Land 
System (where the farm is larger than for family consumption). A landowner may keep a part of his 
land as land for family consumption (as an economic buffer without relying on buying foods in the 
market, also for practicing farming skills as a technological buffer and returning to agriculture once 
lost off-farm jobs as a social buffer) even if he does not produce sufficiently on it. The rest of the 
land is land for market. If nobody would like to lease it in, the landowner may keep it even without 
sufficient production, so that overproduction could be avoided. But if other farmers, without being 
forced by any one, merely out of their own economic considerations, would like to lease it in to 
achieve economies of scale, reduce costs and become viable or more competitive, the owner could 
not refuse, so that irrational production abandonment could also be avoided. The minimum lease 
term should be determined according to the local conditions and the nature of the crops. Having 
rented in contiguous parcels of different owners, the tenant would have the right to remove their 
boundaries and join parcels together so as to eliminate fragmentation (which is also an unsolved 
task under private land ownership), with the original boundaries recorded in the cadastre and a map 
and shown by field signs. Once the leasing contract is over, the owner has the right to withdraw the 
land. But if he does not produce sufficiently on it for maximally one year, while other farmers wish 
to lease it in for so doing, he could not decline. (2) Different treatments to land. The EU should 
gradually reduce and finally abolish protectionism, and make the non-environmentally sensitive 
land (no matter whether highly or lowly productive) available for full-time farmers to achieve 
economies of scale, while setting aside the environmentally sensitive land (both highly and lowly 
productive). Set-aside is temporary and not enough. Such land should even be converted back 
forever to the nature (forests, lake land, grass land and wet land). Its landowners should not produce 
cereals, but could still pursue production of fruits, vegetables, livestock, fishery, afforestation, 
processing of agricultural products, transportation, rural tourism, and other off-farm activities. Thus 
full-time large farmers could be boosted, overproduction of cereals reduced, multi-functionality of 
other agricultural and rural sectors promoted, and the environment improved. 
Some explanations are necessary as follows. 
1. The above-proposed legislation does not intend to replace land reform of distributing land 
for individual ownership out of equity reasons, which is still necessary where a few persons own 
large areas of land while many peasants own none or little (especially in some countries in Africa, 
Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia). Nevertheless, there would be no harm but benefits 
in adopting it before the land reform, as well as during and after it.   40
2. After the land reform, if there are few off-farm activities and farmers still have to rely on 
land for survival, the protection of tenants from eviction, control of land rent at the low level, and 
land-holding ceiling to prevent the revival of feudal landlordism through land repurchasing would be 
necessary, as Japan implemented following the land reform of 1946-50 (this point is particularly 
relevant to those African, Latin American, and South and Southeast Asian countries which have just 
carried out land reform). But once off-farm activities have developed and absorbed many part-time 
and absent farmers, such restrictions should be evolutionarily removed to facilitate the land transfer to 
the full-time farmers, as Japan did during 1962-80. Those countries which have reached the similar 
stage but not yet abolished such restrictions, e.g., Thailand (Onchan 2002), are advised to do so now. 
On this respect, the author would like to point out that there is still room for China to 
improve. Since the early 2000s, the state first replaced various fees on farmers by agricultural tax, 
then waved the tax in many provinces, increased other financial and material supports (Chen & Qi 
2005), and gave decoupled subsidies to farmers (XHNA 2005), so as to maintain farmers on 
agriculture and attract part-time and absent farmers back to farming. They brought about positive 
results as China has kept basic self-sufficiency in cereals. However, as many part-time and absent 
farmers returned to farming, the industrial labor shortage has been strengthened (Guo 2005). Some 
part-time and absent farmers did not want to return to farming. They boiled the free seeds from the 
government and sowed them, and showed the non-growing result to the officials so as to convince 
them that they could not farm (Rui 2005). Moreover, increasing decoupled direct subsidies is not a 
fundamental solution to promote agriculture. Once the decoupled subsidies have exceeded the 
standard of the WTO for China, but many farmers still did not want to farm, then further raising 
decoupled subsidies would become protectionism. Thus, in the author’s view, the fundamental 
solution would be to encourage (though not force) those farmers who prefer to earn off-farm 
income to do so, rather than attracting them back to farming, while transferring a part or even all of 
their inefficiently used land to the fewer full-time farmers who love farming, so that the latter could 
achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, become viable and more competitive. Evolutionarily, 
more and more peasants would move to the industry and services with higher off-farm income, 
while the fewer remaining full-time farmers would also gain from economies of scale and 
strengthen agriculture. 
3. Implementing this legislation could reach the aim of the traditional land consolidation, but 
without the difficulties of exchanging ownership and locations of fragmented small parcels, and 
regardless of the inheritance which may further fragment the ownership and location of the family 
farms. Of course, it does not exclude the implementation of the traditional land consolidation. 
4. As presented above, a land waste tax may suffer from the difficulties of determining the 
tax levels, escaping of the landowners, low incentive of other farmers to report it to the tax officers, 
the ineffectiveness and corruption of the tax officers. The proposed legislation would be more 
effective, because as long as a land for market has been insufficiently cultivated for maximally one 
year, while other farmers wish to lease it in, the owner could not refuse and the local land 
authorities could exercise the lease even if the landowner is absent. Full-time farmers would have 
the incentive to report it to the land authorities since it would be they who would have access to it. 
5. This legislation is much more lenient than land confiscation or obliged land sale while 
still reaching the same aim of avoiding land waste. 
6. This legislation may overcome the above-mentioned fundamental dilemma between 
overproduction and irrational and polyopolistic land use, and the derived dilemmas. In particular, it 
allows a certain degree of production abandonment as long as other farmers do not wish to lease in 
the insufficiently produced land beyond the family consumption need of the owners, so that 
overproduction could be avoided. But if other farmers wish to do so, then the landowners could not 
decline, so that the full-time farmers could achieve economies of scale, reduce costs and become 
viable or more competitive in both domestic and international markets. Accordingly, it would 
prevent under-self-sufficiency in cereals because once it has appeared, domestic food prices would 
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produced land of the part-time and absent farmers so as to produce more. It would also permit the 
full-time farmers to reduce costs and become more competitive in the international markets.  
7. Under the proposed Dual Land System, the land for family consumption is still held by 
the part-time and absent landowners so that their family need for vegetables and cereals could be 
catered, farming skills kept, and small farmers not crowded out of agriculture, hence an appropriate 
solution; while the land for market is leased competitively to the full-time farmers, so that they 
could achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, be viable and more competitive and obtain 
incentives for longer term investment. If the landowner is absent, the local land authorities could 
implement the leasing of the land for market, hence an effective solution. Therefore, this legislation 
would be suitable for both traditional and modern agriculture, fragmented small and consolidatorily 
enlarged land, low and high income economies, food under-self-sufficiency and overproduction 
stages, and developing and developed countries under private land ownership. 
8. Of course, the part-time and absent farmers should be allowed to lease out even their land 
for family consumption on a voluntary basis. But they should make sure that they would not 
withdraw such land before the leasing contract is over (if the tenant has not violated the contract), 
so as not to affect the interests of the tenant. 
9. Would this legislation make land lease more complicated as the local land authorities 
would have to distinguish farmers into full-time, part-time 1 (mainly on farming), part-time 2 
(mainly on off-farm jobs) and absent, or large and small scale? Such distinction is for theoretical 
and statistical reasons (as in the Japan Statistical Yearbooks). In the real operation, as long as a part 
of the land (beyond the family consumption need of the owner) has been insufficiently produced for 
one year, and the owner has no intention to sufficiently produce on it the next year, while other 
farmers would like to lease it in, then there would be no need to know whether the owner is full-
time, part-time 1, part-time 2 or absent, large or small farmer, for the local land authorities to 
authorize the leasing the land beyond his family consumption need. 
10. In so doing, the market is not repealed, but would be promoted. (1) If the landowner 
himself cultivates the land, he could compete in the market. (2) If his insufficiently used land for 
market is requested by several farmers, he could select one offering the highest rent, hence a leasing 
market. (3) After winning the contract, this tenant could compete in the market. (4) If the lessee 
failed to fulfill the contract, the landowner (or in his absence land authorities) would have the right 
to stop the contract and transfer it to another tenant, so as to guarantee the land to be really operated 
competitively. 
11. If the highest rent a requester could offer is still lower than the amount the owner 
demands, should the state compensate for the gap in order to avoid obliging the owner to lease land 
out? Practically speaking, (1) if so, the owner may demand increasingly high and exorbitant amount 
of rent, so that the state could not afford. Suppose a landowner charged 500 Euro as the annual rent 
of his land, and there were four requesters who could only afford to pay 100, 200, 300 and 400 Euro 
respectively. The landowner could pick the 400 Euro payer (other conditions equal) as the tenant. 
But if the state paid the gap of 100 Euro to the landowner, he would ask for 600 Euro next year, 700 
Euro further next year, . . . and an increasingly unlimited amount in the future, which no state could 
afford. (2) If the state had to set up a ceiling on the compensation it pays (e.g., 100 Euro, so that the 
landowner could not receive more compensation if he charged over 500 Euro), this would also be 
an obligation, thus a certain degree of obligation could not be avoided. (3) Even if the state could 
afford to pay a compensation for the gap, this would be another form of protectionism not allowed 
by WTO. Thus the state should not compensate for the gap. Theoretically speaking, this gap is 
actually a polyopolistic profit (just like a monopolistic and oligopolistic profit), and should thus not 
be allowed. This approach reflects a mixed economy combining market economy (the owner could 
choose the highest rent bidder – 400 Euro payer) and state intervention (the owner could not refuse 
to lease land out at a rent lower than his demand – the state would not compensate for the gap of 
100 Euro). Thus this is not a command economy which excludes market economy, but a third way 
between them.   42
12. One may suggest to divide the decoupled direct payment of the EU between the landlord 
and tenant, rather than giving all of it to the tenant, so that landowner may have incentive to lease 
land out. But in so doing, the part given to the tenant may not be enough to cover his costs in cross-
compliance with the environmental, food safety, animal welfare standards. Thus, the landowner 
may be provided with some other incentives to lease the land out. One possibility would be a 
reduction or exemption of the agricultural tax and land rent tax. But the total sum of all kinds of 
subsidies and incentives should be decreased to the WTO standard. 
13. One may think that this legislation may violate one of the private property rights - right 
to use and not to use one’s property; and put landowners at an inferior position in negotiations with 
tenants. But since cultivable land on this earth can no more be created, if some landowners neither 
use their land nor allow other farmers to use a part of it (unless paying high rents), this would 
amount to polyopoly, similar to monopoly and oligopoly which are not permitted by modern 
capitalism. A part of such high rents is profits from polyopoly of land just as profits from monopoly 
and oligopoly . For example, large firms like Microsoft, Nokia, Simens cannot do whatever as they 
wish just because they are private firms, but must follow national and international laws, especially 
the anti-monopoly and anti-oligopoly laws. It seems that such laws have put them at an inferior 
position in negotiation with consumers. But actually they have just put them at a fair position so 
that they can only earn normal competitive profits but not monopolistic and oligopolistic ones. The 
rationale under the proposed legislation is the same as that under the above-cited Western European 
laws: land is not only a private property, but also a scarce natural resource, and should be used in a 
rational and competitive way for the social, economic and environmental interests which are in 
accordance with the fundamental interests of the able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers. 
14. One may also hold that democracy should not oblige landowners to lease land out. But 
in many developed countries, their democracy has forced domestic taxpayers and consumers to pay 
more for agricultural products, and compelled developing countries to suffer from their 
protectionism, just to protect the irrational and polyopolistic interests of their landowners. Moreover, 
democracy of the developed countries has set up so many regulations on the use of private 
properties, such as the speed and noise of private cars, pollution of private factories, and pollution 
of private landowners on their own and neighbors’ land. At the under-self-sufficiency stage, the 
above-mentioned Western European countries all used democracy to oblige an efficient land use. 
Logically, the same democracy should also establish regulations for a rational and competitive land 
use at the overproduction stage. 
15. Would the landowners in general accept this kind of obligation? At the under-self-
sufficiency stage, they have accepted as mentioned-above, because they could understand that 
otherwise the whole nation would suffer from hunger. At the overproduction stage, they would also 
accept if sufficient dialogue could be made so that they could understand that otherwise the whole 
nation would either resort to protectionism or lose basic self-sufficiency in cereals (as the EU faces) 
or suffer from both (as Japan has encountered). Actually at the beginning of 2005, the EU has re-
launched the Lisbon Strategy to permit, encourage and strengthen competition. This proposed 
legislation is promotive to this Strategy. 
16. By this legislation, would full-time large farms get oligopoly and suffocate competition 
in the land leasing market? This would not happen as there are optimal farm sizes in each location 
which would deter farm size from becoming too large and concentrated in few farmers.  
17. By this legislation, private land ownership will not be affected, but irrational and 
polyopolistic land use could be avoided. As for how to implement and organize the leasing while 
catering the interests of the landowner, tenant and society, and in particular avoiding misuse of land 
by the tenant, the landowner could choose the highest rent bidder, and they could share the inputs 
and outputs, so that not only the landowner but also the tenant would have the incentives to achieve 
the highest profits, prevent losses, and avoid deterioration of the land quality. This has been 
practiced in the USA (see Zhou 2001: 374-7). If the landowner is absent and the land authorities 
have to rent out his land for market, then they should call for tender and rent the land to the person   43
who is the most experienced and skillful, and bids for achieving the highest rent, and investment in 
improving the infrastructure and quality of the land, using more organic fertilizer and less chemical 
one, protecting the environment, etc. If the lessee did not implement the contract, then the land 
authorities will have the right to stop and transfer it to another competent tenant via tender. The 
above-cited 1979 law of the Tuscan Region of Italy also shows a good example of implementation. 
Relevant laws should also be established. For example, according to Giannoni (2005), in the EU, 
there are large companies which pay high rents to landowners, but do not apply fertilizer. In so 
doing, land fertility may be lost in four-five years time. Some of the landowners know this problem, 
but still lease land to them out of the fear that the agriculture of the EU has no future, and in order 
to earn easy and quick money. Thus the EU should stipulate both maximal level of chemical 
fertilizer (to prevent pollution) and minimal level of organic fertilizer (to protect fertility) to be 
applied, make field examinations and impose penalties on those who have violated them. Just as 
implementing other regulations, the costs of examinations should be born by the taxpayers and 
penalty payers. 
18. There are countries where the clarification of land property rights still has not been 
completed, such as Albania where a land may be claimed by several families of a clan (Vittuari 
2005). Needless to say, such clarification should be completed and land ownership certificates 
issued. However, even before this uneasy and time-consuming task has been finished, the proposed 
legislation could be exercised. The local land authorities could authorize the lease of the 
insufficiently produced land beyond the family consumption need of the claiming families to the 
full-time farmers (which would at least be better than land waste), and distribute the rent to the 
claiming families in a roughly equal way as a temporary solution. Of course, it would require field 
trials to find a suitable solution.  
19. Would self-sufficiency in cereals stop international trade? There are several kinds of 
rice, wheat and other cereals. No country could produce all of them economically, so that 
international swaps would exist even if a country has achieved self-sufficiency in cereals in terms of 
quantity. Moreover, the author advocates only a basic self-sufficiency in cereals, so that 
international trade would be kept in cereals, and also continue in non-cereal products. 
20. Following this legislation, the world prices would tend to be stable as the possibilities of 
both under-self-sufficiency and overproduction would be largely reduced. 
21. Once the environmentally sensitive land (both highly and lowly productive) has been 
permanently converted back to the nature (forests, lake land, grass land and wet land), its 
landowners should not produce cereals, but could still pursue production of fruits, vegetables, 
livestock, fishery, afforestation, processing of agricultural products, transportation, rural tourism 
and other off-farm activities. The government could pay them a subsidy until they could earn a 
normal living upon non-cereal production activities, which is not regarded as trade-distorting. 
22. Though the principles of this proposed legislation should be adapted to local conditions, 
it would be universally appropriate to give full-time farmers access to the insufficiently produced 
land beyond the family consumption need of the part-time and absent farmers and convert the 
environmentally sensitive land to the nature once stable overproduction has happened. 
23. Here the author uses a dynamic and evolutionary approach from minimizing to 
abolishing protectionism. (1) If a country has not rationally and competitively used all its cultivable 
land while implementing protectionism to achieve basic self-sufficiency in cereals, its protectionism 
could not be regarded as having been minimized (such as Japan and South Korea with much idled 
land). In the large farm sector of the EU, currently leasing is widespread. Would it mean that all 
cultivable land has been rationally and competitively used so that its protectionism could be 
justified as already minimized to keep basic self-sufficiency in cereals? The answer is no, because it 
is the protectionism at the expenses of the taxpayers and consumers and developing countries which 
enables the tenants to pay high rents to the landowners to lease land out. (2) Once a country (such 
as the EU, Japan, South Korea) has rationally and competitively used all its cultivable land, it would 
be able to avoid overproduction and under-self-sufficiency of cereals (with normal natural   44
conditions) without the coupling, price supports, export aids, and high decoupled payments, hence 
abolishing the bulk of protectionism. However, if its costs were still higher than in other countries, 
it would need to implement import restrictions so as to keep basic (or certain degree of) self-
sufficiency of cereals. In so doing, it could be regarded as having minimized protectionism. 
Likewise, if a country has rationally and competitively used all its cultivable land but suffers from 
unfavorable natural conditions (such as the cold weather in Norway), it would be understandable for 
it to implement import restrictions as a minimum degree of agricultural protectionism in order to 
achieve basic (or as much as possible although below basic) self-sufficiency in cereals. (For 
example, the free trade zone to be established in 2010 between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and China as decided in November 2001 will reduce the tariff on rice in 2015 only by 50%, 
rather than 100%, reflecting the strategic desire of the member states to keep a certain degree of 
self-sufficiency in rice.) With certain import restrictions in cereals, the full-time large farmers could 
still gain advantage within their own countries. Such countries could also allow cheaper laborers of 
foreign countries to enter to lease in their land or become farm employees so as to reduce labor 
costs further. (3) Once a country with higher costs has joined a super-nation like the EU, it would 
be unnecessary for each Member State to reach basic self-sufficiency in cereals, as some Member 
States could overproduce to feed the others and there would be no threat of losing basic supply of 
cereals [this view has been shared by the EU Commission policy-makers Ahner (2004) and 
Borchardt (2004), but some farmer organizations (e.g., in Sweden) (Eriksson 2004) and Member 
States (e.g., Hungary) (Somogyi 2004) still wish to attain basic self-sufficiency in cereals at the 
Member State level], so that the remaining protectionist policy of import restrictions could be lifted 
within the super-nation. (4) As the EU has been expanding, so as the free trade zones and friendly 
partnerships among countries in other continents, more and more nations in such zones and 
partnerships could get rid of wars and threats among the member states, and have no need to 
achieve basic self-sufficiency in cereals in each member state, so that their free trade could be 
promoted and import restrictions in cereals diminished and finally ended. Following this trend, the 
free trade zone between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China would further reduce 
rice tariff after 2015 and finally to zero. Likewise, the EU would not invade China again as many of 
its Member States did before 1949 and China would not invade the EU just as it has never done so. 
The EU and China could avoid threatening each other and establish friendly partnership of free 
trade to import the agricultural products from the cheaper partner, so that the EU could finish the 
last protectionist policy of import restrictions versus China. There would be two possible results. (i) 
The prices of China’s cereals were raised by the imports of the EU but (plus transportation costs) 
still lower than the EU level so that the EU could import all cereals from China. This would be less 
realistic as even those countries with largest farms would not be able to feed the whole world (if 
without protectionist policies to give unfair incentives to farmers to overproduce and make dumping 
to other countries), not to mention China dominated with small farms, so that other countries would 
still have room to produce for their internal and external markets. (ii) The imports by the EU from 
China raised the prices of China’s products (plus transportation costs) to or over the EU level so 
that the EU farmers could produce a part for its own demand although less than basic self-
sufficiency. This would be more realistic. Under either result, each partner may still produce its 
own localized special products which, even if the costs were higher, could still be bought 
domestically and externally. For example, although China is still a developing country, a part of its 
population has become rich and consumed the more expensive fragrant rice of Thailand. (5) Only 
after the whole world has entered a permanent era without sanctions, embargos, invasions, wars and 
threats, and without tariffs, would basic self-sufficiency in cereals for any nation be unnecessary as 
each country could import from others, so that the last protectionist policy of import restrictions 
could be abolished among all countries of the world. (Of course, if before the arrival of this stage, 
some countries do not care about losing basic self-sufficiency in cereals and would like to rely on 
imports without any import restriction, they should be allowed to do so.) But even at that stage, the 
pure and idealistic Ricardian model of free market mechanism would still not function (as argued   45
above, food shortages and high prices would not necessarily induce those owners with polyopoly on 
land to produce more to cater the need of the poor consumers, rather, they would prefer to enjoy the 
high prices and profits), so that this proposed legislation would be necessary permanently – as long 
as polyopoly of land ownership still exists on this planet without the possibility of creating more 
cultivatable land. 
 
VI. Potential Global Relevance 
 
The implementation of the above-proposed legislation would promote fraternity and fair 
competition among nations of the world.  
1. For decades, developing countries have had two types of problems - their own and 
agricultural protectionism from the developed nations. This proposed legislation is relevant to them. 
But even if they have resolved this microeconomic root, the protectionism of the developed nations 
would still make their agriculture less or un-profitable, hence continuing the inequality and injustice 
between the developed and developing countries. Moreover, protectionism in agriculture of the 
developed nations and that in industry and services of the developing countries are interrelated - if 
the developed nations could not reduce and abolish theirs in agriculture then the developing 
countries would not do their part in industry and services in the WTO negotiations. But in order to 
reduce and abolish agricultural protectionism, the developed nations would have to prevent 
irrational production abandonment, otherwise they would not lift protectionism. This legislation 
could just resolve this microeconomic root also in the developed nations, so that the further 
reduction and final abolition of their agricultural protectionism would be possible, hence also the 
industrial and service protectionism of the developing countries.  
2. The EU has requested the CEE countries to postpone free movement of their cheap 
laborers into the Western EU areas up to seven years after the accession, worrying that they may 
easily take jobs away from the Western EU workers. Most of them have agreed on a reciprocal 
basis vis-a-vis the Western EU Member States (Enlargement June 2002), hence dividing the 
enlarged EU. The Western EU farmers have been actually allowed to lease in land in CEE, but not 
at the same level vice versa. The author discovers that in the agricultural sector, the reality and trend 
in the world as well as the EU is that able-bodied farmers are more interested in earning higher off-
farm income, so that allowing the full-time farmers from CEE to lease in the irrationally and 
polyopolistically used land of the part-time and absent farmers of the Western EU would not 
constitute competition with and crowd them out of agriculture [in fact there is already an 
agricultural labor shortage in some parts of the EU, e.g., the Italian agricultural trade unions have 
demanded the Labor Ministry and Parliament to adopt a law to permit hiring workers for its 
agriculture from outside the EU-15 with possible priority to the accession countries (Bani 2002)]. 
The CEE full-time farmers could certainly benefit the Western EU by their lower labor costs just as 
their Western EU counterparts could help CEE by capital and technology. The competition among 
Western and CEE full-time farmers in the leasing markets in both the Western and CEE EU areas 
would be mutually constructive. Therefore, at least in this sector, there should be no harm for the 
Western EU to allow free labor movement from CEE immediately (or through a much shorter 
transition period) after or even before the accession, hence increasing fraternity and fair competition 
between the Western and CEE EU areas. 
3. If all countries of the world could adopt this legislation and allow not only nationals but 
also foreigners to lease in the irrationally and polyopolistically used land of their part-time and 
absent farmers, then resources would be more efficiently used, poverty, inequality and injustice 
reduced, the environment improved, sustainable rural development achieved, fair competition on 
the WTO basis boosted, and fraternity among nations further advanced. There is already a 
successful example: China has allowed external and foreign farmers to lease in its land for 
agriculture, and farmers from its external regions (Hong Kong and Taiwan Province) and foreign 
countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, the USA, etc.)   46
have indeed done so there (see Zhou 2001: 258-9), while Chinese farmers have rented land in other 
countries, e.g., Hungary and Russia, for agriculture. 
  The author’s analyses and proposals have obtained 39 positive responses by the EU, EU 
accession countries, CABI, OECD, UN, CSD, FAO, UNEP and World Bank, been accepted in their 
continuously upgraded versions by 11 international conferences in 10 countries during November 
2001 - November 2004, and presented in seven seminars in four countries during May 2003 – April 
2005. When in South Korea in July 2004, the author discussed deeply with seven professors in six 
universities of four cities, one senior research fellow in a national research institute and directors of 
two national farmer organizations who told me that my proposals would be adoptable in their 
country, but it usually follows the EU and USA. The author then visited WTO in Geneva in 13-14 
September 2004 and discussed with three officials (one planned to spend 30 minutes but voluntarily 
extended to two hours and a half because he had not heard these ideas from others). During 20 
September - 29 October in Brussels, the Deputy Director of the Cabinet of the New (2004-09) EU 
Commissioner for Agriculture (spending one hour and a half), Deputy Director-General for 
Agriculture responsible for policy-making and Head of Unit 'Studies and overall approach' (one 
hour in Brussels by both and over two hours by the Deputy Director-General during 4-6 November 
in Halle Germany), Director of the EU Task Force on Land Tenure of the EU Commission; 
representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture of 19 EU Member States (who prepare for and 
attend meetings of the EU Council of the Agricultural Ministers); two Members of the European 
Parliament for agriculture and regional development respectively; directors of 20 farmer 
organizations from 17 EU Member States and four pan-EU farmer organizations; and 
representatives to the EU from the Ministries of Agriculture of South Africa (plus Ambassador), 
India; Argentina, Brazil; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and USA received the author. The 
author’s analyses and proposals have gained wide understanding and support from the European 
officials, scholars and farmer organizations' representatives he has talked face to face deeply. In 
particular, the Deputy Director-General for Agriculture of the EU Commission and Deputy Director 
of the Cabinet of the New EU Commissioner for Agriculture confirmed that if irrational production 
abandonment happened following the further reduction of protectionism, the EU would have few 
choices - resuming the reduced protectionism would not be possible, so that adopting the author’s 
proposals would be the remaining choice. 
Having not heard any alternate to the remedy in this paper in the various international 
occasions in the past years, the author is extremely happy that Commentators EA1 & EA2 (2005) so 
confidently conclude that ‘Certainly there are inefficient land uses across the world, but not only 
one cause, and certainly not only one simple remedy’. The author should thus be most grateful if 
any distinguished readers could be so nice as to give the author the following information: (1) 
another work which has provided global evidence that the irrational and polyopolistic land use by 
able-bodied part-time and absent small farmers has become the most fundamental microeconomic 
root of the three persisting world-wide macroeconomic problems: food under-self sufficiency, 
overproduction and agricultural protectionism; (2) any alternate to the author’s proposals for both 
developing and developed countries at both under-self-sufficiency and overproduction stages, 
without changing private land ownership, to achieve the following aims at the same time: 
minimize/abolish/prevent protectionism, while avoiding irrational production abandonment and 
overproduction; reinforce full-time large farmers, whereas not crowding part-time and absent small 
farmers out of agriculture; reach/maintain basic self-sufficiency in cereals, meanwhile promoting 
multi-functionality of other agricultural and rural sectors and improving the environment; (3) such 
alternate would be adoptable (e.g., by the EU) to shorten/complete the already decades-long (and 
probably endless) protectionism reduction process; and (4) how could the EU (and Japan, South 
Korea, etc.), without adopting the author’s proposals, break the swing between protectionism (and 
subsequent overproduction) and abandonment of production (and consequent loss of basic self-
sufficiency in cereals). 
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